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COPS REMAIN TOPS OF TRUSTED 
JUSTICE PROFESSIONS
For the sixth year in a row, police 
officers are more trusted by 
Canadians than judges, lawyers, or 
law makers. In a May 2007 Leger 
Marketing report entitled 
“Profession Barometer” (www.legermarket 
ing.com), police officers were once again the most 
trusted profession in the criminal justice system. 
The report, which provides trust ratings for 23 
professional occupations, saw police officers attain 
an 84% trust rating, followed by judges at 74%, 
lawyers at 52%, and politicians (law makers) at 15%. 
Police Officers
Police officers improved by three 
percentage points (+3%) on the trust 
barometer over last year and are now at a 
five year high. They are trusted most in 
Atlantic Canada (87%), but least in 
Alberta (80%). Ontario saw the greatest 
gain (+7%) followed by British Columbia (+3%) and 
Quebec (+2%). Alberta (-5%), the Prairies (-3%), and 
the Atlantic Provinces (-2%) all saw police trust 
ratings drop.
Judges
The trust rating for judges dropped 
four percentage points (-4%) over last 
year. Judges are trusted most in 
British Columbia (77%), where their 
rating jumped two percent (+2%) since 
2006. However, their trust ratings dropped in all 
other regions, including the Atlantic Provinces (-8%), 
Quebec (-1%), Ontario (-4%), the Prairies (-11%) and 
Alberta (-2%).  
Lawyers
Lawyers now sit at a 52% trust rating, 
up four percent (+4%) over last year and 
also, like police, sit at a five year high. 
Lawyers are trusted most in Atlantic 
Canada (57%), but least in British 
Columbia (46%). They saw gains in all 
regions (Atlantic Canada +5%, Quebec 
+5%, Ontario +3%, the Prairies +7%, 
Alberta +3%), except British Columbia where they 
lost a single point (-1%). 
Politicians (Law Makers)
Politicians have remained at the 
bottom of the rankings for the fifth 
straight year, with a 2007 trust rating 
of 15%, up one point from 2006. 
Politicians are trusted most in Alberta 
(22%), but least in Quebec, Ontario, and British 
Columbia, all at 14%. Politicians made gains in Alberta 
(+7%), followed by the Prairies (+5%), Quebec (+4%), 
and Ontario (+1%). There was no change in British 
Columbia while the Atlantic Provinces dropped seven 
percentage points (-7%). 
An American Perspective
The Canadian experience is quite 
similar to its neighbours to the 
south. In an August 2006 Harris 
Poll (www.harrisinteractive.com), 
when U.S. adults were asked who they would trust to 
tell the truth, police officers had a 76% trust rating 
while judges sat at 70%, Members of Congress 
(politicians) at 35% and lawyers at 27%. All of these 
occupations saw an increase over a 2002 poll (police 
officers +7%, judges +5%, and lawyers +3%), except 
Members of Congress which remained unchanged. 
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e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
“I am a Criminology 
major and Legal Studies 
minor at [university].  I 
find your  newsletter to be extremely 
informative and contemporarily  
contextual.  I would be honoured and privileged if I 
could be the  recipient of the newsletter.  I believe 
that it will aid in my studies while remaining me 
informed with many and dynamic processes of justice 
and law.” - University Student, British Columbia
*********
“May I be added to your mail out list for 
the latest editions of the 10-8 
newsletter?  I find I’m using them more 
and more to keep up to date and I appreciate the user 
friendly format.” - Police Constable, Ontario 
*********
“Can you please add me to your 
electronic subscription for 10-8...I find 
your material helps guide the manner in 
which I complete a report to Crown.” - Police 
Constable, British Columbia
*********
“I have read two of your newsletters and 
all I can say is WOW. I have been a 
constable for approximately 6 years now. 
I find your case law examples to be well laid out and 
easy to read.” - Police Constable, Manitoba
*********
I am a cadet with the Atlantic Police 
Academy and I just recently had a 
chance to read your recent edition of In 
Service...I found the articles very interesting and 
helpful for me as a new recruit.” - Police Cadet, 
Atlantic Police Academy
*********
“I am the new Training Sergeant. Please 
forward your publication to me. Thanks 
and your efforts and commitments to 
policing are certainly appreciated down here in 
Ontario.” - Police Sergeant, Ontario
*********
“I have received 10-8 a few times and 
enjoyed reading it. Beyond being 
enjoyable reading material, I find it 
offers good case law references.” - RCMP Constable, 
British Columbia
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IN-SERVICE LEGAL ROAD TEST
The “In Service” Legal 
Road Test is a simple 
multiple choice quiz 
designed to challenge your 
understanding of the law. 
Each question is based on a case featured in this issue. 
See page 27 for the answers.
1. Wiretaps related to criminal organization offences 
do not require the police to consider the failure of, 
the likelihood of success, or the impracticability of 
other investigative procedures.
 (a) True
 (b) False
2. Arbitrary vehicle stops under provincial traffic laws 
infringe s.9 of the Charter but are saved by s.1 
regardless of the reason for the stop.
 (a) True
 (b) False
3. Personal “offence-related property” seized pursuant 
to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act is 
automatically forfeited if the person is convicted of 
a designated substance offence.
 (a) True
 (b) False
4. Personal “offence-related property” seized pursuant 
to the Criminal Code is automatically forfeited if the 
person is convicted of an indictable offence.
 (a) True
 (b) False
5. An arrestee does not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the soles of his shoes seized by police 
upon booking.
 (a) True
 (b) False
NEW RCMP COMMISSIONER 
APPOINTED
On July 16, 2007 Mr. William J.S. 
Elliot was appointed the 22nd 
Commissioner of the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police.  He and his wife 
Carolyn have four children. 
DANGEROUS DRIVER’s CAR 
FORFEITED AS OFFENCE-RELATED 
PROPERTY
R. v. Adamson, 2007 BCSC 745
The accused pled guilty to dangerous 
driving causing bodily harm and refusing 
to provide a breath sample in British 
Columbia Supreme Court. She had been 
drinking before she drove into one victim, dragging him 
under her vehicle 88 feet and seriously injuring him. He 
sustained a spiral fracture to his left femur and 
punctured a lung. She then drove into a cyclist, injuring 
him and shearing his bicycle in half. The cyclist 
sustained a chipped vertebra, nerve damage, abrasions, 
and short term memory loss. In addition to seeking a 
jail sentence and a driving prohibition, the Crown 
sought forfeiture of the accused’s vehicle she was 
driving at the time of the offence, a 2002 Mercedes 
Benz Kompressor valued at $26,000.
Section 490.1(1) of the Criminal Code requires a court 
to order forfeiture of property when a person is 
convicted of an indictable offence and the court is 
satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the 
property is offence-related property and an offence 
was committed in relation to that property unless the 
impact of the forfeiture would be disproportionate. 
“Offence-related property” is property by means or in 
respect of which an indictable offence is committed or 
that is used in any manner in connection with the 
commission of an indictable offence.
The accused argued that the offence-related property 
provisions target the tools of the trade, attack the 
means of the crime rather than its ends, and should be 
limited to circumstances where there is an element of 
deliberation, such as a vehicle used to commit a bank 
robbery. 
Justice Loo found the forfeiture provisions to be 
extremely broad and encompassed the vehicle driven in 
this case. “There is no dispute that [the accused’s] 
vehicle is offence-related property,” she said. “It is 
impossible to commit the offence of dangerous driving 
without a vehicle.” She continued:
Once the Crown has established that the vehicle is 
offence-related property…the onus shifts to [the 
accused] to establish that the impact of the 
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grounds, that his rights under s.8 of the Charter had 
been breached when the police used a powerful 
flashlight to look through the tinted glass and into 
the cargo area of the pick-up and the evidence 
should be excluded under s.24(2). The Crown, on the 
other hand, argued the officer’s conduct was not a 
search at all as recognized in s.8; the marihuana was 
in plain view and the arrest was lawful. 
In assessing whether a breach of s.8 had occurred 
Justice Joyce made a number of findings, including:
• The officer had no safety concerns when he 
shone his flashlight into the canopy;
• The officer could not see into the cargo area 
with his naked eye, unaided by his flashlight;
• The officer did not have reasonable grounds to 
arrest the accused before he looked into the 
canopy based only on the smell of marihuana.
Using the totality of the circumstances test,  
Justice Joyce found the accused did have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the cargo area 
of his truck that “was covered by the closed canopy 
and blocked from public view by the darkly tinted 
windows.” He stated:
[The accused] was present when the 
search was carried out.   It was 
carried out with regard to the 
interior of his motor vehicle of 
which he had possession and control.  
He had covered the cargo area of his 
truck with a canopy that had a door 
that closed and windows that were 
tinted so as to preclude viewing in 
normal conditions without the use of 
a flashlight.  It cannot be said that 
the contents of the cargo area were on public 
view.  [The accused] had taken steps to hide them 
from view.  [The accused] had the ability to 
regulate access to the cargo area and to exclude 
others from it.  While the technique that [the 
officer] used to view the interior was less 
intrusive than physically entering into the space 
over which the owner sought privacy, he had to 
resort to using a high powered flashlight, 
described as being equivalent to a car’s headlight, 
in order to pierce the veil created by the darkly 
tinted windows.  In my view there was an intrusion 
into [the accused’s] territorial privacy.  The 
technology used by the police, while obviously not 
as intrusive or penetrating as x-ray technology 
was not the same as looking through a clear glass 
forfeiture would be disproportionate based on 
the criteria in s.490.41(3). That is, [she] must 
establish that an order of forfeiture of the 
vehicle would be disproportionate to the nature 
and gravity of the offence, the circumstances 
surrounding the commission of the offence, and 
her criminal record, if any. [para. 56]
In this case the judge found the order for the  
forfeiture of the vehicle was not disproportionate 
and ordered it forfeited.
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
NON SAFETY RELATED USE OF 
FLASHLIGHT UNREASONABLE
R. v. Grunwald, 2007 BCSC 767
Two police officers set up a roadblock 
for the purposes of stopping and 
checking all vehicles for Motor Vehicle 
Act infractions. The accused, driving a 
pick-up truck with an extended cab and a canopy 
fitted with dark, tinted windows, was stopped in the 
roadblock. While one officer checked driving and 
insurance documents the second officer checked the 
sticker on the licence plate. While 
doing so, he smelled an odour of 
marihuana but did not believe he had 
enough grounds to arrest on that 
basis. After confirming the decal was 
valid, the officer shone his flashlight 
through the side tinted canopy window 
and saw a number of garbage bags. 
One of the bags was partly opened and 
he could see it contained clear Ziploc 
bags holding marihuana. 
The officer went up to the accused and told him he 
was under arrest for possession of a controlled 
substance and directed him to park his vehicle. He 
pulled over and stopped, but took off when the 
officers approached. After a short pursuit the 
accused was arrested. His truck was searched and  
police found marihuana, $390,600 in cash, cell 
phones, a pager, calculators, and notebooks 
containing phone numbers and calculations. 
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court on a 
charge of possessing marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking, the accused argued, among other 
“In summary, I find that 
visually searching the cargo 
area by using a powerful 
flashlight to penetrate the 
tinted windows constituted an 
unreasonable search contrary 
to s. 8 of the Charter.”
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window.   It was only by using a device that [the 
officer] could look through the visual barrier that 
he had erected between his private space and the 
public.
………
In my view, the present case is an example of the 
use of technology, albeit at a relatively low level, 
to intrude on the privacy of an individual. 
[references omitted, paras. 31-32]
Justice Joyce also found the use of the flashlight 
was distinguishable from cases where courts have 
allowed officers to shine flashlights into vehicles 
for officer safety. He wrote:
In the case at bar, the use of the flashlight was 
not incidental to the check stop and was not used 
for the purpose of employing officer safety.  [The 
officer checking the accused’s licence and 
insurance] found it unnecessary to use his 
flashlight to perform a visual inspection of the 
interior of the cab for officer safety.   He had 
done that visual inspection and assured himself 
there were no safety concerns.   He was nearly 
finished with his inquiries related to the purpose 
for which he had detained [the accused], i.e. to 
ensure a valid driver’s license, insurance, etc.  He 
had only to run the information through the police 
data systems before [the accused] could be on his 
way.   After [the arresting officer] had checked 
the insurance tag on the licence plate any lawful 
duties he had to perform in connection with the 
purpose for the detention had come to an end.  He 
then proceeded to use his flashlight to undertake 
a search, not as a proper search incident to the 
check stop, but as part of a criminal investigation. 
[para. 37]
And further:
The search was not incidental to the lawful check 
stop, nor was it otherwise authorized by law.  
There were no exigent circumstances.  I conclude 
that the initial visual search with the flashlight 
was unreasonable and contrary to s. 8 of the 
Charter.  As a result, the arrest was also unlawful 
because the grounds were dependent upon a 
Charter violation, and the subsequent physical 
search of the interior of the vehicle was also 
unlawful and unreasonable. [para. 41]
The evidence, however, was ruled admissible under 
s.24(2). Although visually searching the cargo area 
by using a powerful flashlight to penetrate the 
tinted windows constituted an unreasonable search 
contrary to s. 8 of the Charter, the subsequent 
police conduct flowed naturally and reasonably from 
the discovery of the marihuana.  The totality of the 
breach was not so serious so as to warrant excluding 
the evidence.  
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
ROOFTOP VENT SNIFF 
VIOLATES s.8 CHARTER
R. v. DiPalma, 2007 BCSC 536
Police received a complaint of a 
suspected marihuana grow operation 
at a business complex consisting of 
three buildings and a total of 55 
strata units. Vehicle entry to the complex was 
controlled by a gate that was open in the day but 
closed at night and required a key fob to open. An 
officer met with the complainant, who was a member 
of the strata council, and was shown two black 
garbage bags containing marihuana clones and shake 
that was found in a dumpster at the complex. The 
officer asked if he could go on the roof of one of the 
buildings to smell the vents. A ladder was obtained, 
and the officer went onto the roof and checked the 
vents coming from each of the strata units. An odour 
of marihuana was detected coming from two vents 
and a search warrant was obtained for unit 107. 
Surveillance was set up on the unit and the accused 
was seen to enter and exit it. He was pulled over a 
few minutes later and keys were found on him that 
were used to open the unit when police executed the 
warrant. Police found 355 marihuana plants and 
extensive equipment used in the operation. The 
accused was charged with producing marihuana.
During a voir dire in British Columbia Supreme Court 
the officer testified he never considered getting a 
warrant and believed he had lawful permission to 
climb onto the roof from the strata council member 
and detect the odour from the vents. He assumed 
the complainant had the authority to permit him 
access to the roof. 
The Crown argued that the accused did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the roof area 
above the strata unit and therefore could not 
contest the lawfulness of the search. The accused 
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was not present during the search, he never 
exercised control over the roof, did not have 
exclusive right to determine who had access, and 
each roof unit was common property. The strata 
council was responsible for maintaining and repairing 
the roof and had the right to access it. The accused 
submitted the roof was not common property but 
part of his strata lot.
Justice Ehrcke agreed with the accused. “The fact 
that a limited number of other persons may have a 
right of access to the roof for the specific purpose 
of maintenance and repair does not eliminate the 
owner’s claim of a privacy interest,” he said. He 
continued:
…I find that the owner of each strata lot would 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
roof area of their unit.  The fact that the roof of 
[the accused’s] unit could be accessed by the 
strata council for purposes of repair and 
maintenance does not detract from the fact that 
he would have a reasonable expectation that other 
persons would not be permitted access to his roof 
for purposes unrelated to repair and maintenance.  
Accordingly, I find that [accused] does have 
standing to challenge the lawfulness of the police 
search of his roof.
The Crown was unable to establish the search was 
nonetheless reasonable. Justice Ehrecke found 
there was  “no basis for concluding that an individual 
strata council member would have the authority to 
grant the police access to the roof for the purpose 
of carrying out a police search.” Nor was there 
evidence respecting the identity of the complainant. 
The complainant’s statement  to police on this point 
was hearsay and could not be used to prove the truth 
of that statement. Thus, the accused’s rights under 
s.8 of the Charter were breached.
The evidence, however, was admissible under 
s.24(2). The breach was not highly serious and the 
police acted in good faith. They did not realize their 
conduct was unlawful and believed they had valid 
consent to search. Further, the charges were 
serious and the evidence was crucial to the Crown’s 
case. The exclusion of evidence would be more 
damaging on the repute of the administration of 
justice that its admission. The accused was 
convicted of both charges.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Reasonable Grounds: Impaired Driving
“As to the objective components [of 
reasonable grounds], I am satisfied that 
the appeal court judge erred in assessing 
the various indicia on which the constable 
formed his belief in isolation, rejecting 
each on the grounds of consistency with other 
explanations.  The indicia must be evaluated in total. 
Specifically the appeal court judge reviewed the [accused’s] 
submissions that each of these indicia were equivocal or 
consistent with the behaviour of a driver who was not 
impaired. Although acknowledging that the circumstances 
must be taken together, in effect he weighed them 
separately, and concluded that the totality of the evidence 
did not overcome the equivocal nature of the parts.  In 
doing so he also omitted reference to the [accused’s] failure 
to respond to the flashing lights of the following police car 
while driving five city blocks.” - Nova Scotia Court of Appeal 
Justice Chipman R.  v.  Andrea, 2004 NSCA 130
REASONABLE GROUNDS 
EXISTED DESPITE NO DRUG 
TRANSACTION SEEN
R. v. Stebeleski & Santangelo, 
2007 MBCA 1
A police sergeant investigating a 
supplier of drugs named Silva received 
information from an anonymous source 
that traffickers would place an order 
to Silva using a coded message on his pager. A dial 
number recorder warrant was obtained and Silva’s 
pager was monitored. The messages were decoded 
and police were able to determine the amount of 
drugs ordered and when the delivery would take 
place. The police intercepted a message that 
informed them the accused Stebeleski would meet 
Silva at 1:00 pm to purchase five ounces of powdered 
cocaine and six ounces of crack. 
The sergeant instructed his officers to stop 
Stebeleski’s vehicle immediately after the vehicle 
met with Silva and arrest the occupants. Shortly 
after 1:00 pm the vehicles met and then departed in 
different directions. However, no actual transaction 
was seen. Stebeleski was driving and the accused 
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Santangelo was a passenger. Both were arrested and 
placed in the back of a police vehicle. Santangelo had 
a pager and a substantial amount of cash while  
Stebeleski had a cell phone and cash. A brown paper 
bag was found resting between the driver’s seat and 
the centre console containing five ounces of 
powdered cocaine and six ounces of crack. Another 
cell phone and two score sheets were also found in 
the vehicle. The vehicle was searched further at 
police headquarters and more cocaine and a cell 
phone charger was located. 
At trial in Manitoba Court the accuseds were 
convicted of possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking. The trial judge concluded the police had 
reasonable grounds to make the arrest and the 
search of the vehicle without a warrant did not 
violate s.8 of the Charter. Both accuseds appealed 
to the Manitoba Court of Appeal arguing, in part, 
that their arrests and incidental searches were 
illegal because the police did not see an actual 
transaction take place and therefore did not have 
reasonable grounds to conclude an offence had 
occurred. It was thus contended that the physical 
evidence should have been excluded.  
Justice Huband, authoring the opinion of the Court, 
first noted that since the sergeant gave the order 
to arrest and search he would need the reasonable 
grounds to believe the accused committed the 
indictable offence of possessing cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking. In holding that the sergeant 
did have reasonable grounds, Justice Huband stated:
[The sergeant] was confident that the occupants 
of the vehicle registered to Stebeleski, who 
turned out to be Stebeleski and Santangelo, would 
be found with cocaine as a consequence of a 
transaction with Silva.   Thus, [the sergeant] 
ordered their arrest and a search of the vehicle 
incidental to the arrest.  His confidence was well 
placed:
(1)   Silva was a known drug dealer.
(2) Silva received coded messages from 
purchasers on a pager.   Police authorities 
were able to intercept messages on the pager.
(3)  The police had broken the code used in pager 
messages.  They were able to identify orders 
for the supply of drugs emanating from a 
vehicle registered to Stebeleski.
(4)  ... a pager intercept informed [the sergeant] 
that the occupant or occupants of the 
Stebeleski vehicle wished to meet with Silva 
at 1:00 p.m. to purchase a quantity of drugs.
(5)  A few minutes after 1:00 p.m., a meeting did 
take place.  The passenger in the Stebeleski 
vehicle is first to engage Silva in conversation 
and is joined by the driver.  At the conclusion 
of an 18-minute meeting with Silva, the 
Stebeleski vehicle and the vehicle driven by 
Silva depart in opposite directions.  
(6)  The passenger in the Stebeleski vehicle has 
the same general appearance as a man seen 
meeting with Silva and suspected of 
purchasing drugs from him in the month of 
August.
In my view, the trial judge was fully justified in 
concluding that [the sergeant] had reasonable 
grounds to believe that a transaction had taken 
place and to order the arrest and the incidental 
search….  [paras. 14-15]
The accuseds’ conviction appeals were dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
TELEWARRANT CRITERIA 
REQUIRES COMMON SENSE 
APPROACH
R. v. Cam & Phun, 2007 BCPC 0038
Police received a report of electricity 
theft from BC Hydro and launched an 
investigation. A search warrant was 
subsequently obtained and submitted 
by telecommunication to a justice of the peace. The 
Information to Obtain said the officer called the 
Surrey Provincial Courthouse but was told there was 
no justice of the peace available. He said it was 
impractical to attend the Burnaby Justice Centre 
from the Surrey detachment because of distance 
(25 km), time (45 minutes each way), and manpower 
considerations (limited resources available). Police 
found 622 marihuana plants in the basement of the 
premises and the accuseds were charged with 
marihuana production and possession for the purpose 
of trafficking.
Section 487.1 of the Criminal Code allows a peace 
officer who believes that an indictable offence has 
been committed and that it would be impracticable 
to appear personally before a justice to make 
application for a warrant by means of 
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telecommunication.  Under s.487.1(4) an information 
submitted by telephone or other means of 
telecommunication must include a statement of the 
circumstances that make it impracticable for the 
peace officer to appear personally before a justice.
During a voir dire in British Columbia Provincial Court 
the accused attacked the search warrant on a 
number of grounds, including that it was not 
impracticable for the police to attend in person. 
Judge Bowden, however, found it was impracticable 
for the officer to appear personally before a justice 
of the peace. He said:
[I]t is my view that travelling 28 kilometres from 
the Surrey detachment to the Burnaby justice 
centre would also be impracticable.   From a 
commonsense standpoint, once it has been 
established by the police officer that a justice of 
the peace is not available at the Surrey 
courthouse, then the impracticability of a 
personal appearance is established because of 
the distance and travel time necessary for a 
personal appearance in Burnaby.  Furthermore, I 
am not to substitute my view for that of the 
justice of the peace who issued the warrant and 
based on the reasons stated by [the officer], the 
justice of the peace could have properly issued a 
telewarrant. 
Section 487.1 had been complied with and there was 
no breach. The evidence was admissible. 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
POLICE OFFICER NOT DUTY 
BOUND TO PROVIDE PHONE 
BOOK IN CIRCUMSTANCES
R. v. Chase, 2007 NBCA 39
The accused was stopped by police for 
speeding and was subsequently 
arrested for impaired driving. He was 
read his Charter rights and given a 
demand for breath samples. On arrival at the police 
station, the accused tried but was unsuccessful in 
contacting his lawyer of choice. He was told duty 
counsel was available and the on-call duty counsel 
was contacted by phone. The phone was given to the 
accused and the officer left the room. Two breath 
samples were subsequently obtained with readings of 
140mg%. 
At trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court the 
accused was convicted of operating a motor vehicle 
with a blood alcohol content over 80mg%. He 
appealed to the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s 
Bench arguing his s.10(b) Charter rights were 
violated because the police did not  provide him with 
a copy of the telephone directory but instead called 
duty counsel for him. Justice Garnett, however, 
disagreed. She ruled that the accused chose to 
speak to duty counsel, took the breathalyser test 
without protest, and did not testify on the voir dire. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
The accused then appealed to the New Brunswick 
Court of Appeal arguing the implementational duties 
on a police officer under s.10(b) were breached 
because the police officer, not the accused, dialled 
the number of the on-call legal aid lawyer and did not 
provide a copy of the white and yellow pages. In a 
unanimous judgment the Court dismissed the 
application for appeal. There was no evidence the 
accused was dissatisfied with the officer’s conduct 
or that he would have done something different 
from what he did. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
FAMILIAR FRENCH PHRASES:
“voir dire”-“to speak the truth”. A trial within a trial 
to decide a particular issue. A hearing which a judge 
conducts in the absence of the jury to determine if 
evidence is admissible or some other matter relating 
to a trial. For example, if the prosecution seeks to 
admit a confession of the accused, the court must 
conduct a voir dire to determine if the confession was 
obtained voluntarily.
Did you know that the Supreme Court of Canada recently ruled that a roadblock, set up by 
police within minutes of receiving a 911 call indicating that a number of persons were openly 
displaying handguns in a strip club’s parking lot, was constitutional? see page 34!!!
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ROOM-TO-ROOM SEARCH FOR 
OCCUPANTS LAWFUL
R. v. Chan, 2007 BCPC 39
At about 10:00 pm police officers were 
dispatched to a report that two males 
with a long pole were cutting wires in 
front of a residence. No address was 
provided but the house was described. Police 
attended and found a house with a cut wire, hanging 
down from the side of the house. One officer, using 
a flashlight, went to the back of the house looking 
for signs of forced entry. None were found so police 
went to the front door and rang the doorbell, 
wanting to ensure the occupants were safe and had 
the right to be in the house.
The accused came to the door, stepped 
on to the porch, and closed the door 
behind him. He said he had not seen any 
suspicious persons and said the cut wire 
happened a week ago when a truck hit 
it. The accused, however, did not 
answer questions about whether the 
house belonged to him. Noting that the 
accused looked cold, an officer asked if they could 
go inside. While standing in the front foyer, the 
officers smelled a strong odour of marihuana. The 
accused produced identification and said he lived 
elsewhere. Concerned about the possibility of booby 
traps or other persons with weapons, the officers 
did a cursory room-to-room search to check for 
other occupants and ensure officer safety. They 
also believed they had reasonable grounds to believe 
there was a marihuana grow operation and wanted to 
ensure nothing was destroyed before getting a 
warrant. 
Two grow rooms were found and the accused was 
arrested and transported to the police detachment. 
The residence was secured and a telewarrant was 
executed. Police found 457 marihuana plants and  
charged the accused with marihuana production and 
possession for the purpose of trafficking. 
During a voir dire in British Columbia Provincial Court 
the accused argued, among other issues, that the 
warrantless entry into the premises violated s.8 of 
the Charter. In his view, the suggestion by the police 
to go inside the house was a ruse in order for them 
to investigate the suspected marihuana grow 
operation. They should have obtained informed 
consent to enter the residence and advised the 
accused of his right to counsel under s.10(b). As a 
result, he contended the evidence obtained should 
be excluded under s.24(2). 
Justice Rae disagreed with the accused and found 
the police entry into the residence did not violate 
the Charter. She stated:
The law with respect to a warrantless entry of a 
residence is clear.  The police have a duty to enter 
a residence to ascertain the safety of the 
residents when there is a hang up call, and there 
is no answer to the door or someone answers and 
says everything is alright.  The police are allowed 
to enter a residence in hot pursuit when they have 
reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe there is an 
offence in progress.   This duty 
is limited to situations where 
there is a concern for 
protection of life and the safety 
of the residents.  They are also 
allowed to enter a residence on 
the invitation of the resident.  
The police also have a duty to 
investigate suspicious activity and in doing so, they 
have a license to knock on doors and request 
information.
The argument here really boils down to the 
motives of the police when they made the 
suggestion to the accused that they could go 
inside.  If the police had used that suggestion as 
a ruse to get into the residence because they had 
a strong hunch that the accused was involved in 
some kind of criminal activity, then it was an 
unauthorized entry absent the informed consent 
of the accused, and his Section 8 and 10 Charter 
rights were breached.  If the court finds that the 
accused invited the police into the residence, then 
the initial entry was lawful.  
The police say that they literally stumbled onto 
this marihuana grow operation.   They say that 
their only motive for suggesting they enter the 
residence was that the accused obviously 
appeared to be cold and they wanted to further 
question the accused to ensure that the accused 
had a valid right to be in the residence and that 
the occupants, if any, were safe. 
They say that the cut wire and the explanation for 
it given by the accused, which was inconsistent 
“The police also have a 
duty to investigate 
suspicious activity and in 
doing so, they have a 
license to knock on doors 
and request information.”
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with the information they had received, required 
that they confirm the identity of the accused and 
his right to be at the residence. I find that, given 
the information the police 
had at the time, this was a 
valid and genuine concern. ... 
I am satisfied on the 
evidence that when the 
police knocked on the door 
of the residence, they were 
intent on determining 
whether the male who 
answered the door was a 
suspect or an innocent 
bystander. They were in the 
process of determining his 
identity and whether or not 
he was entitled to be in the 
residence at the time.  
They had not targeted him as a suspect in a 
criminal investigation.  [One officer] noted that it 
was not unusual for some people to speak with the 
police on the doorstep after closing the door.  He 
noted that there are sometimes concerns around 
small children or pets escaping.  
The evidence of the police was that the accused 
appeared visibly cold, and as a convenience, they 
commented that they could go inside.   In the 
circumstances, given the weather, which I find to 
have been chilly, and the fact that the accused 
was inappropriately dressed for the conditions, 
this does not in my view appear to be an 
unreasonable suggestion.   The evidence of all 
three officers was that the accused opened the 
door and indicated to the officers to step inside.  
There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that 
the accused felt he was obliged to comply with a 
police request to enter the premises. There is 
nothing to suggest that the police were not 
content to deal with the accused on the doorstep.  
He wasn’t free to leave until the police could 
satisfy themselves that he had a valid right to be 
in the residence, in furtherance of their 
investigation of a possible break and enter in 
progress.  They were entitled to make these 
enquiries.  I am aware of the fact that police 
officers need to be aware that they do carry some 
authority when they make these suggestions, and 
that some people might feel that they are 
required to comply.  However, the suggestion was 
in the nature of an option, and the evidence of the 
officers was that the accused appeared to freely 
open the door and invite them to stand in the 
foyer. The police did not ask to go into the 
residence, and once they were inside, they stood 
in the foyer and did not ask to look around until 
they detected the smell 
of growing marihuana.  
I find that the accused 
freely invited the officers 
into the residence and 
that it was not an 
unauthorized entry.  Given 
that it was an invitation 
freely extended by the 
accused, to merely step 
into the foyer and that 
the police at that point 
only wished to confirm 
that he was entitled to be 
in the residence, I find 
that there was no breach of his Section 8 and 10 
Charter rights.
Defence makes the point that the police did not 
really believe there was a break and enter in 
progress because they did not station anyone at 
the rear of the residence to catch anyone 
attempting to escape.  That argument really plays 
into what the police said in their evidence.  They 
were simply checking to ensure that the residents 
were safe and that they were entitled to be in the 
residence.   They were merely following up on a 
report of a suspicious incident.   They had not 
made a determination that anything untoward was 
going on inside the residence.  
Once they were inside the residence, however, the 
police became immediately aware that they had 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe there 
was a marihuana grow operation on the premises.  
They did a quick room-to-room search for the 
purpose of police safety, to ensure there weren’t 
other persons in the residence, and to make sure 
nothing was destroyed before they were able to 
obtain a warrant.  They were entitled to do this.  
[paras. 18-25]
The evidence was admissible. 
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
Note-able Quote
“Police arrested two kids yesterday, one was 
drinking battery acid, the other was eating 
fireworks. They charged one and let the other one 
off.” - Tommy Cooper
“Once they were inside the residence, 
however, the police became immediately 
aware that they had reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe there was a 
marihuana grow operation on the premises.  
They did a quick room-to-room search for the 
purpose of police safety, to ensure there 
weren’t other persons in the residence, and 
to make sure nothing was destroyed before 
they were able to obtain a warrant.  They 
were entitled to do this.”  
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DIGITAL RECORDING AMMETER 
DOES NOT BREACH PRIVACY 
RIGHTS
R. v. Cheung & Huang, 2007 SKCA 51
Police received information from a 
confidential source with peace officer 
and drug investigator experience that 
two nervous looking oriental males 
driving an out of province vehicle were seen park in 
front of a residence and unload four or five strings 
of black pots bound by rope, a green garden hose, 
two extension cords, and take them inside. A search 
of the local utilities services showed the monthly 
average power consumption was normal. 
Then, at the request of police, the utility company 
placed a digital recording ammeter (DRA) on 
Cheung’s home to monitor the power consumption 
over a two week period. A DRA measures and records 
the amount of electricity flowing into the home on an 
ongoing basis in five to seven minute intervals. This 
data can then be charted to determine cycles of 
power consumption. 
The results revealed a significantly elevated level of 
power consumption over a normal residence of that 
type, and a high cyclical power consumption for 10 
and two hour intervals over a 24-hour period. A 
search warrant at the residence was 
obtained to search for a grow 
operation. When police executed the 
warrant Huang was found inside, 
along with cash and marihuana. Both 
accused were charged with 
producing marihuana, possession for 
the purpose of trafficking, 
possession of crime property, and 
stealing power. 
At trial in the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench 
the accuseds were acquitted. The trial judge found 
the police violated their s.8 Charter rights and the 
evidence was excluded under s.24(2). In the trial 
judge’s opinion, they had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the information detected by the DRA. The 
police intruded into  the privacy of the home by using 
the DRA and therefore breached s.8.
The Crown appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal arguing the trial judge erred in concluding 
the accuseds had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the DRA readings. The unanimous Court 
set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial. 
Although the accuseds may have had a subjective 
expectation of privacy it was not objectively 
reasonable. 
The DRA readings may have been probative of an 
illegal grow operation, however, they did not disclose 
intimate details about the accuseds’ lives. The 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal referred extensively 
to two Supreme Court of Canada decisions where 
they found a person has no reasonable expectation 
of privacy in information police had acquired; R. v. 
Tessling (police used a FLIR attached to an aircraft 
to obtain a heat signature for a residence) and R. v. 
Plant (police checked power consumption records 
with the utility company). In allowing the Crown’s 
appeal, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal stated: 
First, we note that the trial judge indicated that 
the information in this case is considerably more 
valuable to the police, in detecting the illegal 
activity taking place in the home, than the FLIR 
data was found to be in Tessling.   In our view, 
usefulness to the police is not the test.   As we 
have noted, the information obtained from the 
power company in Plant was also valuable to the 
police as was the information obtained in Tessling 
found to be useful. We do 
not believe, however, that 
utility to the police is what 
the Court in Tessling had in 
mind when it talked about 
the quality of the 
information. The focus in 
Tessling, on the nature and 
quality of the information, 
was for the purposes of 
determining whether 
information about the biographical core of an 
individual was revealed.  FLIR technology may 
reach the capacity to tell where and what human 
beings are doing.   It is in that respect that the 
Court in Tessling was concerned about the quality 
of the technology.     Like the FLIR technology, a 
DRA is still “off-the-wall” and not “through-the-
wall” technology, to use the terminology mentioned 
in Tessling.
Secondly, we disagree with the trial judge's 
conclusion that the police technique was intrusive 
“Placing a box on power company 
property in order to monitor power 
consumption is no more intrusive 
in terms of technique than 
[obtaining information from a 
power company or flying over a 
home and taking a FLIR picture].”
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in relation to the privacy 
interest either in terms of 
the method used or the 
information obtained. As to 
the method, neither in 
Plant nor in Tessling was 
the technique found to be 
intrusive.   In Plant, the 
information was obtained 
from the power company. 
In Tessling, the information was obtained by flying 
over the home, taking a picture and then assessing 
the image taken.  Placing a box on power company 
property in order to monitor power consumption is 
no more intrusive in terms of technique than 
either of these methods.
As to what is revealed, we have already touched on 
this issue.     DRA data, like FLIR data, does not 
show precisely what is going on in the home.  
Certain inferences, as to the presence of an illegal 
marihuana grow operation, may be drawn from this 
information if it is coupled with other information, 
but as the trial judge herself indicated, DRA data 
does not indicate conclusively that such an 
operation is present.  … As Crown counsel 
acknowledged in oral argument, it is inconceivable 
that a search warrant could be issued in relation 
to a marihuana grow operation on the basis of DRA 
data alone.   This is so because there could be 
legitimate bases for both the amount of power 
consumption and the consumption pattern shown in 
this case.  Again, in that respect, this case is like 
Tessling where it was decided that no warrant 
could ever properly be granted on the basis of a 
FLIR heat profile alone.
Finally, on the question of whether the DRA data 
exposed any intimate details of the accuseds' 
lifestyle or core biographical data, the trial judge 
herself concluded that it would be "somewhat 
strained to say that this information falls within 
the 'biographical core of personal information' 
that the Charter is designed to protect or that it 
affects the 'dignity, integrity and autonomy' of 
the person whose home is the subject of the 
DRA."   Nonetheless, she concluded that the 
accused had an objectively reasonable expectation 
of privacy in this data.    As we have indicated, we 
see this part of the analysis being largely 
answered by Plant.     Plant indicates that the 
information about the pattern of power 
consumption at issue in that case could not 
reasonably be said to reveal intimate details of an 
individual’s life because electricity consumption 
reveals very little about the personal 
lifestyle or private decisions of the 
occupant of a residence.  While the DRA 
data in this case may be more probative 
of the existence of an illegal grow 
operation than the data in Plant, we 
believe this to be a difference of degree 
only and not a difference that changes 
the substantive result of the analysis.  
We also note that if the power had not 
been siphoned off by the accuseds illegally, the 
information that would be necessary for a warrant 
would have been available in this case in 
accordance with Plant.   It would be a troubling 
conclusion if we were compelled to say that the 
accuseds have an expectation of privacy in 
information, in which, but for their theft of 
power, they would have no expectation of 
privacy. [footnotes omitted, paras. 20-23]
Since there was no privacy expectation s.8 was not 
engaged and therefore there was no reason to 
address s.24(2).
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
SEATBELT RELATED CHECK 
LEGITIMATE REASON FOR STOP
R. v. Doell, 2007 SKCA 61
The accused was stopped driving a truck 
as he was seen leaving the parking lot of 
a bar because it didn’t look like he was 
wearing a seatbelt. A roadside breath 
sample was subsequently obtained and the accused 
was arrested for impaired driving. He was taken to 
the police station and provided breath samples over 
80mg% and was charged accordingly.
At trial in Saskatchewan Provincial Court the 
accused argued the police used the seatbelt check 
as a ruse to stop him, it was arbitrary under s.9 of 
the Charter, and therefore violated his rights. The 
trial judge disagreed and found the reason for the 
stop was to investigate a possible seatbelt offence. 
Although the judge would have acquitted the 
accused if he was charged for not wearing a seatbelt 
since the police were uncertain whether he was 
wearing it, they nonetheless had the right and duty 
to investigate whether the accused had his seatbelt 
on. There was no Charter breach and the accused 
was convicted of driving over 80mg%.  
“It would be a troubling 
conclusion if we were compelled 
to say that the accuseds have an 
expectation of privacy in 
information, in which, but for their 
theft of power, they would have 
no expectation of privacy.”
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The accused appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of 
Queen’s Bench. The appeal judge ruled that the 
police could legitimately stop a vehicle if the officer 
had a rational basis for thinking the driver was not 
wearing a seatbelt. However, if the police stop a 
driver without any particular reason for thinking a 
driver is not wearing one, the stop is arbitrary and 
violates s.9 of the Charter. In this case, the appeal 
judge found the officer did not have a rational basis 
for believing the accused was not wearing his 
seatbelt, the stop was therefore arbitrary, the 
certificate of analysis excluded, and an acquittal was 
entered. 
The Crown then appealed to the Saskatchewan Court 
of Appeal arguing the appeal judge erred in holding 
the police unjustifiably violated the accused’s rights. 
Justice Richards, writing the opinion of the Court, 
agreed with the Crown.
Section 40(8) of Saskatchewan’s Highway Traffic 
Act allows the police to randomly stop vehicles. It 
reads; “A peace officer who…is readily identifiable as 
a peace officer; and…is in the lawful execution of his 
or her duties and responsibilities; 
may require the person in charge 
of or operating a motor vehicle to 
stop that vehicle.” This statutory 
authority validly limits the rights 
of drivers in the interests of 
promoting highway safety if the 
reason for the stop is related to 
traffic or vehicle safety. Justice 
Richards stated:
Vehicle stops which are random 
or arbitrary have been found to 
be justifiable pursuant to s. 1 of the Charter so 
long as they are conducted for a purpose which 
relates to "driving a car such as checking the 
drivers licence and insurance, the sobriety of the 
driver and the mechanical fitness of the vehicle". 
[R. v. Ladouceur, R. v. Mellenthin] A stop for the 
purpose of checking for seat belt use falls within 
that rubric.
Contrary to the reasoning of the summary 
conviction appeal judge, in the realm of traffic 
safety there is no requirement that a police 
officer have a "rational basis" for believing an 
offence has been committed before stopping a 
vehicle. If the reason for an arbitrary stop falls 
within the scope of the matters identified in 
Ladouceur and Mellenthin, it can be justified 
pursuant to s. 1 of the Charter. The mere fact 
that the stop is arbitrary does not determine its 
legality. [paras. 20-21]
This was not a case where police were stopping a 
driver for a reason unrelated to highway safety. In 
determining whether a stop is legitimately made for 
traffic or vehicle safety, a court must focus on the 
reason for the stop, rather than whether the police 
had a “rational basis” for it. Justice Richards held 
the stop was made to check whether the accused was 
wearing a seatbelt. Stopping a vehicle for a seatbelt 
related purpose is justifiable under the random stop 
powers of motor vehicle legislation because it is a 
legitimate reason related to driving a car:
In my view, the trial judge made no error in 
concluding that [the accused] had been stopped 
for a traffic safety purpose and, more 
particularly, had been stopped to determine if he 
was wearing a seat belt. [An officer]l said he had 
watched [the accused’s] truck traveling through 
the parking lot "and the driver appeared not to be 
wearing a seat belt". As the truck turned onto 
Moss Avenue, [the officer] observed "the driver 
reach across the shoulder 
and make motions to - as if 
he were doing up his seat 
belt". He communicated this 
to [a second officer].
[The second officer] made 
the decision to stop [the 
accused]. He recalled a 
comment that the driver of 
the truck was not wearing a 
seat belt but did not recall 
whether he or [the first 
officer] had made the observation. His notes 
indicated that he could not ascertain for sure 
whether [the accused] was wearing his seat belt. 
[The second officer] relied heavily on his notes 
and was unable to explain why he would have 
allowed [the accused] to drive a number of blocks 
before pulling him over if seat belt use had been 
the issue. Nonetheless, he was clear and 
consistent that the stop was made to check if [the 
accused] was wearing a seat belt. [para. 25]
And further:
Thus, in light of the record as a whole, I see no 
reviewable error in the trial judge's conclusion 
that [the accused] was stopped for the purpose of 
“Vehicle stops which are random or 
arbitrary have been found to be 
justifiable pursuant to s.1 of the 
Charter so long as they are conducted 
for a purpose which relates to ‘driving a 
car such as checking the drivers 
licence and insurance, the sobriety of 
the driver and the mechanical fitness of 
the vehicle’”
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checking seat belt use. As a result, it does not 
matter either that the evidence fails to establish 
[he] was not wearing a seat belt or that the 
evidence offers an arguably thin basis for 
suspecting he was not wearing a seat belt. The 
essential point is this. The stop was made for a 
purpose contemplated by Ladouceur and 
Mellenthin and can thus be justified as a 
reasonable limitation of [the accused’s] rights 
even if it was arbitrary. [para. 28]
There was no Charter breach, the Crown’s appeal was 
allowed, and the accused’s conviction was restored.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
AN AMERICAN VIEW:
Police Pursuits
“[W]e are loath to lay down a rule requiring 
the police to allow fleeing suspects to get 
away whenever they drive so recklessly that 
they put other people’s lives in danger. It is 
obvious the perverse incentives such a rule 
would create. Every fleeing motorist would know that escape 
is within his grasp, if only he accelerates to 90 miles per 
hour, crosses the double-yellow line a few times, and runs a 
few red lights. The Constitution assuredly does not impose 
this invitation to impunity-earned-by recklessness. Instead, 
we lay down a more sensible rule. A police officer’s attempt 
to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that 
threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate 
the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing 
motorist at risk of serious injury or death.” - U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice Scalia, Scott v. Harris, (2007) 
An Oral Argument Snipit:
Justice Scalia: “[I]f this fellow 
driving 90 miles an hour is 
responsible for endangering people, 
you're proposing a rule that says if 
there's a 50 percent chance that 
he'll hurt some innocent person and 
a 50 percent chance that he'll get 
hurt if you try to stop him, you 
shouldn't do anything. I don't agree with that.”
Mr. Savrin [counsel for the petitioner]: “Well, Your Honor 
--”
Justice Scalia: “I'd stop him. I mean, he's the fellow 
that's causing the danger, endangerment, isn't he?”
OFFICER’s REASONABLE 
GROUNDS STANDARD TOO 
HIGH: EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE
R. v. MacEachern, 2007 NSCA 69
The accused disembarked a Via Rail 
train and walked towards the terminal 
entrance carrying only a knapsack. A 
police Criminal Interdiction Team was 
at the station and had a narcotics detecting dog with 
them. The dog and its handler approached the 
accused; he slowed and walked an arc around the 
officer and his dog. The dog was interested in the 
accused, followed him, and sat behind him at the 
train station entrance, indicating the presence of a 
narcotics odour. Then, the dog followed the accused 
into the terminal and sat behind him a second time. 
The dog handler notified another officer of the 
positive alert. This officer approached the accused 
who was making travel arrangements with a shuttle 
bus driver, presented his police badge, identified 
himself, touched the accused on the elbow, and 
directed him to the side of the train station to 
answer some questions. The officer told the shuttle 
bus driver that the accused was “not going 
anywhere.” He asked the accused for his train ticket, 
boarding pass, and identification to determine 
whether he had a one-way pass, paid cash, and 
purchased the ticket last minute.
The accused was subsequently arrested for 
possession of narcotics, read his Charter rights 
under s.10(b) and given the police caution. He said he 
wanted a lawyer. His knapsack was searched and 676 
grams of marihuana and 282 grams of cocaine were 
found. He was re-arrested for possession for the 
purpose of trafficking and charged accordingly.
At trial in the Nova Scotia Supreme Court the 
accused applied to have the evidence excluded under 
s.24(2) of the Charter arguing his rights under 
s.10(b) had been violated. The trial judge concluded 
that the accused was detained when the officer 
touched him and said he wasn’t going anywhere. 
Further, the accused testified he believed he had to 
obey the police. The police, however, failed to advise 
him of his right to counsel and therefore breached 
s.10(b). The judge ruled that the post-detention 
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conversation was inadmissible but the narcotics 
should not be excluded. He was convicted of two 
counts of possession for the purpose (marihuana and 
cocaine) and sentenced to two years. 
The accused appealed to the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal submitting that the trial judge failed to find 
the arrest illegal, that the search breached s.8 of 
the Charter and that the evidence should have been 
excluded under s.24(2). 
Right to Counsel
Justice Fichaud, authoring the 
judgment for the Nova Scotia Court 
of Appeal, agreed the accused’s 
rights under s.10(b) were violated. 
The accused was detained when the 
police touched him, directed him to 
the side where he could be 
questioned, and told the shuttle 
driver he was “not going anywhere.” 
As well, the accused testified he 
believed he had to obey the police. “Upon detention, 
[the accused] was entitled to be informed of his 
right to counsel without delay,” said Justice Fichaud. 
“The officer must inform the detainee of his right to 
counsel before questioning him.”
The Search
A search will be proper as an incident to arrest only 
if the arrest is legal. If the arrest is invalid, the 
search will also be invalid. An arrest under s.495 of 
the Criminal Code will be lawful if there is a proper 
basis founded on reasonable grounds, subjectively 
held and objectively verifiable. In this case, the trial 
judge found reasonable grounds existed from an 
objective point of view but the officer didn’t think he 
had enough. Justice Fichaud described it this way:
Section 495 of the Criminal Code entitled [the 
officer] to arrest [the accused] without warrant 
if [the officer], on reasonable grounds, believed 
that [the accused] had committed an indictable 
offence. Both the objective and subjective 
requirements must exist… The police dog, trained 
to detect narcotics with proven effectiveness, 
had twice given a positive indication. [The 
accused] had shown evasive action. The [trial 
judge] determined that this gave reasonable 
grounds for the arrest of [the accused], 
satisfying the objective test. [The officer] 
nonetheless said that he did not believe that he 
had grounds until after he had questioned [the 
accused]. So the subjective requirement of s. 495 
– [the officer’s] belief that [the accused] had 
committed an offence - was assisted by [the 
accused’s] post-detention answers to the 
questions. Those questions followed the breach of 
[the accused’s] right under s. 10(b) to be informed 
of his entitlement to counsel. The officers 
obtained the narcotics in a search incidental to 
the arrest. [reference omitted, para. 21]
The information the officer 
obtained post-detention in 
violation of s.10(b) could not be 
used to support the officer’s 
grounds. “The subjective 
prerequisite for arrest derived 
from [the accused’s] answers to 
questions that should not have 
been asked before [he] was 
informed of his right to counsel 
under s.10(b),” said Justice 
Fichaud. Since the officer lacked the subjective 
grounds necessary as part of the reasonable grounds 
analysis, the arrest was not lawful and therefore the 
search of the knapsack was not incidental to arrest 
and violated s.8. 
s.24(2) Charter
Although the police violated the accused’s ss.8 and 
10(b) Charter rights, the trial judge did not err in 
admitting the narcotics evidence. The narcotics were 
non-conscriptive evidence and their admission would 
not render the trial unfair. The Charter breaches 
were not willful, nor deliberate. Although the police 
should know the basics of detention ,the officer here 
said he did not believe he had detained the accused. 
There were reasonable grounds to detain the accused 
but the officer had an unreasonably high standard 
and did not arrest out of an abundance of caution. 
The offence was serious and the narcotics evidence 
was critical to the Crown’s case. The exclusion of the 
evidence, rather than its admission, would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.   
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Note-able Quote
“Every act is to be judged by the intention of the 
agent.” - Author Unknown
“The subjective prerequisite for 
arrest derived from [the 
accused’s] answers to questions 
that should not have been asked 
before [the accused] was 
informed of his right to counsel 
under s.10(b). The search of [the 
accused’s] knapsack violated s.8 
of the Charter.”
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IMPACT OF FORFEITURE 
CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING 
SENTENCE
R. v. Craig, 2007 BCCA 234
Police searched the accused’s house and 
vehicle. The house, an older two level 
dwelling with 1,000 square feet of floor 
space, had the entire basement level 
and portions of the main floor devoted to a 186 plant 
marihuana grow operation valued at $87,500.  There 
were three growing rooms and one drying room, 
utilizing 16 electrically-timed industrial growing 
lights running through a system of electrical ballasts. 
There was a ventilation system involving intake, 
exhaust and wall fans, an irrigation system and sump 
pump taking water to and from the plants, and a large 
amount of packaging material, 
scales, score sheets, growing 
instructions, calendars dating 
back three years, and a 
container with about one 
pound of marihuana packaged 
in ounce, quarter-pound, and 
half-pound bags. In her car, 
police found $22,275 in cash, $2,390 in traveller’s 
cheques, $787 USD, and five pounds of marihuana in 
quarter-pound bags, as well as “score sheets” 
documenting marihuana sales. The accused was 52 
years old and had no criminal record. 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
accused pled guilty to producing marihuana and was 
given a 12 month conditional sentence, fined 
$100,000, and a $15,000 victim surcharge. The 
sentencing judge, also ordered forfeiture of the 
equipment used to commit the offence but refused 
to order the forfeiture of the house, worth 
$460,000, under s.16(1) of the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act (CDSA). 
The Crown appealed to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal arguing, among other things, that the 
sentencing judge erred by failing to order the 
forfeiture of the house and that the forfeiture 
should be determined independently from the 
sentence imposed and vice versa. The accused, on the 
other hand, disagreed with the Crown and also 
argued, inter alia,  s.16(1) of the CDSA applied to only 
criminal organizations and not to independent 
entrepreneurs like herself. 
Forfeiture Provisions
Section 16 of the CDSA provides for the forfeiture 
of “offence related property”.  Section 2 of the Act 
defines “offence-related property” as any property 
by means of or in respect of which a “designated 
substance offence” is committed, that is used in any 
manner in connection with the commission of a 
designated substance offence, or that is intended 
for use for the purpose of committing a designated 
substance offence. Producing marihuana is a 
“designated substance offence” and therefore the 
accused’s dwelling house was potentially subject to 
forfeiture under s.16(1). Justice Ryan summarized 
the forfeiture provisions of the CDSA as follows:
[T]he forfeiture provisions of the 
CDSA provide a process whereby 
offence-related property will be 
forfeited to the Crown.   The 
process under s. 16(1) effectively 
makes the order of forfeiture 
mandatory upon the Crown proving, 
on a balance of probabilities, that 
personal property is offence-
related property.  There are, however, different 
considerations that guide the forfeiture of real 
property; in particular, s. 19.1(3) requires the 
sentencing judge to consider the impact of an 
order of forfeiture of real property and whether 
it would be disproportionate having regard to (1) 
the nature and gravity of the offence; (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the 
offence; (3) the offender’s criminal record; and 
(4) if the real property is a dwelling-house, the 
impact of forfeiture on those, other than the 
offender, who use it as their principal residence. 
[para. 46]
Forfeiture not Limited to Organized Crime
Justice Ryan ruled that there was “nothing in the 
language of the history of the enactment that 
suggests the provisions for forfeiture are limited to 
organized crime.” She wrote:
In the first place, the relevant provision on appeal 
is not ambiguous and there is no language in the 
Act that says that its purpose was to apply to 
organized crime alone.  Section 16(1) states that 
the forfeiture of “offence-related property” 
“[T]he forfeiture provisions of the 
CDSA ... effectively makes the order 
of forfeiture mandatory upon the 
Crown proving, on a balance of 
probabilities, that personal property 
is offence-related property.”  
www.10-8.ca
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applies to “a person convicted of a designated 
offence”.   Read in its grammatical and ordinary 
sense, the main limitation is that s. 16(1) applies 
only to interests in property where the property 
interest has been the instrument of the 
commission of a designated drug offence; the only 
other limits are those set out in s. 19.1 when the 
Crown makes an application in relation to real 
property. [para. 50]
She did note, however, that the presence or 
participation of organized crime would be an 
important factor in determining whether forfeiture 
would be disproportionate. She stated:
…ss. 19.1(3) and (4) of the CDSA instruct the 
court to weigh the impact of forfeiture against 
the “nature and gravity of the offence, the 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the 
offence and the criminal record, if any, of the 
person charged with or convicted of the offence.”
In my view, an evaluation of the “nature and 
gravity of the offence” would include, but is not 
limited to, such factors as whether there were 
weapons on the premises, whether the operation 
was harmful to the neighbourhood, whether the 
theft of electricity was involved, the number of 
plants being cultivated, and the sophistication of 
the enterprise.   The “circumstances of the 
offence” would include whether it was done 
because of pressure from other members of the 
community, the financial circumstances of the 
offender, whether the operation was undertaken 
for profit alone, whether the offender lives in 
the house, and other such matters.  
The fact that the offender has or 
does not have a criminal record will 
also be considered. 
Many of these factors will support a 
forfeiture order where a party is a 
member of a criminal organization 
and is operating the enterprise as 
such.  It follows that the presence 
of organized crime would be a 
significantly aggravating factor in 
deciding whether or not to order 
forfeiture. [paras. 51-53]
Primary Sentence & Relationship to Forfeiture 
Forfeiture is an aspect of sentencing and Justice 
Ryan concluded that the primary sentence and the 
forfeiture of offence related property should not be 
each decided in isolation from one another. In other 
words, the consideration of forfeiture may be 
considered with the determination of the primary 
sentence and the primary sentence may be 
considered by taking into account an order of 
forfeiture. The decision with respect to the primary 
sentence and the forfeiture order will have an affect 
on each other. Justice Ryan stated:
Parliament’s choice of the word “impact” brings a 
subjective element into the analysis.  As I read it, 
s. 19.1(3) requires the court to ask what effect 
forfeiture will have on the offender and whether 
its impact would be disproportionate to the 
nature, gravity and circumstances surrounding the 
offence.   The term ‘impact’, in my view, is broad 
enough to include consideration of a primary 
sentence.   Indeed, a sentencing judge could not 
adequately assess the impact of forfeiture of real 
property or a dwelling-house without knowing the 
personal circumstances of the offender, which 
include the primary sentence that has been or will 
be imposed on that offender. [para. 67]
And further:
In sum, while the idea that forfeiture and the 
primary sentence should be considered in air-
tight compartments is outwardly appealing, it 
does not accord with the provisions of the CDSA 
or the jurisprudence.   When faced with an 
application for forfeiture of real property, the 
sentencing judge may consider the primary 
sentence in evaluating the impact of forfeiture.  
Likewise, in determining the 
overall fitness of the primary 
sentence, the sentencing 
judge may consider the 
existence of an order for 
forfeiture.
In reaching this conclusion, I 
am cognisant of the fact that 
the CDSA does not require 
the application for forfeiture 
to take place at the time the 
primary sentence is imposed, 
although this is preferable 
and has typically occurred as a matter of course… 
Where both do not occur at the same time and an 
unfit sentence or inappropriate order of 
forfeiture results, this can be remedied through 
the traditional remedy of appellate review. 
[references omitted, paras. 79-80]
“When faced with an application for 
forfeiture of real property, the 
sentencing judge may consider the 
primary sentence in evaluating the 
impact of forfeiture.  Likewise, in 
determining the overall fitness of 
the primary sentence, the 
sentencing judge may consider the 
existence of an order for forfeiture.”
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Proper Process For Deciding Forfeiture
The Crown submitted that the effect of considering 
ss.16(1) and 19.1(3) created a two step process as 
follows:
1 Once the Crown meets the s.16(1) requirements, 
a presumption of forfeiture applies. This 
requires a conviction for a designated substance 
offence, proof the property is “offence related 
property”, and that an offence was committed in 
relation to the property. 
2 The offender then must displace the 
presumption by satisfying the court the impact 
of the forfeiture would be disproportionate. This 
may require the offender raising or calling 
evidence relating to the factors set out in 
ss.19.1(3) or (4).
Although this approach had been accepted by other 
appellate courts, Justice Ryan rejected it:
I am of the view that because the governing 
provision, s. 16(1), is subject to s. 19.1, the order 
of forfeiture is not automatic.   In my view, s. 
16(1) requires the court, before making an order 
of forfeiture with respect to real property, to 
examine whether the impact of forfeiture would 
be disproportionate in light of the factors set out 
in s. 19.1(3) (and s.19.1(4) if applicable).
At that stage the onus will shift to the offender, 
against whom the order is being sought, to 
establish that the impact of the order would be 
disproportionate.   The offender need not call 
evidence.   He or she may rely on the evidence 
called in the Crown’s case.   Thus, if the Crown’s 
case shows that an offender with no criminal 
record grew one or two plants of marihuana for 
his or her own use, barring other circumstances, 
the offender will have established that the 
impact of the order is disproportionate.  In most 
cases, however, there will be little in the Crown’s 
case that would demonstrate the subjective 
impact of forfeiture on the offender.  Therefore, 
speaking practically, the offender will be obliged 
to call evidence that would satisfy the judge that 
the impact of forfeiture would be 
disproportionate.
In my view, the analysis of s. 19.1(3) applies a 
fortiorari to a “dwelling-house” under s. 19.1(4).  
That section provides that where the real 
property is a dwelling-house the court “shall” 
consider the impact of forfeiture on any member 
of the offender’s immediate family if the 
dwelling-house was the family member’s principal 
residence at the time of the offence.   This 
imposes a duty on the court to consider the 
“impact of forfeiture”, regardless of whether it 
is raised by the offender.  Again, the evidence of 
the impact on the family member will normally be 
within the knowledge of the offender, not the 
Crown.   Therefore, if the offender wishes to 
contest forfeiture under s. 19.1(4), he or she will 
be obliged to call evidence on those matters and 
might include evidence that the dwelling-house is 
a principal residence.   However, this does not 
require the offender to raise the matter; if the 
sentencing judge can rely on any evidence 
adduced by the Crown alone.
To summarize, the CDSA does not impose a two-
step process as advocated by the Crown.  Rather, 
with respect to forfeiture of real property 
pursuant to s.16(1), the onus is on the Crown to 
establish that a person has been convicted of a 
“designated substance offence”, that the 
property in question is “offence-based property”, 
and that the offence was committed in relation to 
that property.   If the subject matter is real 
property, the court, pursuant to s. 19.1(3), is 
required to go on to consider whether the impact 
of such an order would be disproportionate, 
taking into account the nature and gravity of the 
offence, the circumstances surrounding it, and 
the criminal record of the offender.   At this 
point the burden shifts to the offender to 
establish that the impact of forfeiture would be 
disproportionate.   The offender may choose to 
rely on the Crown’s case for proof, or may call 
evidence in support of his or her position.   In 
addition, if the property is a dwelling-house, the 
court, pursuant to s. 19.1(4), must consider the 
“impact of forfeiture” on any member of the 
offender’s family who uses the location as a 
principal residence.
Outcome
As a result of these and other issues, the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal allowed the Crown’s appeal 
and ordered the accused’s home forfeited in 
accordance with s.16 of the CDSA. The conditional 
sentence remained, but the accused’s $100,000 fine 
and $15,000 victim surcharge were set aside. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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BASIS FOR DETENTION 
CAN BE INFERRED FROM 
CIRCUMSTANCES
R. v. Williams, R. v. Fleming, 
2007 BCSC 184
In Williams, a police officer stopped the 
accused after observing a traffic 
violation and detected a strong odour of 
alcohol from the vehicle and noted he had 
bloodshot, watery eyes, slurred speech, and a flushed 
face. Without informing the accused he was detained 
for investigation of impaired driving, he was asked to 
walk to the rear of his truck. After doing so, the 
officer detected a moderate odour of alcohol on his 
breath and noted he swayed from side to side while 
standing. Breath samples were subsequently obtained.
In Fleming, a police officer stopped the accused 
after observing a traffic violation and noted the 
smell of alcohol on his breath and that he had slurred 
speech. Without informing the accused he was 
detained for investigation of impaired driving, the 
officer asked him if he would consent to sobriety 
tests to see if he was sober enough to drive. He 
failed the tests and breath samples were obtained.
During voir dires in British Columbia Provincial Court, 
the accuseds argued that the police violated their 
rights under s.10(a) of the Charter because they 
were never informed of the reason for their 
detention. In their view, the officers were obliged to 
tell them they were detained for investigation of 
impaired driving once it was suspected they had 
consumed alcohol, but before they were asked to 
leave their vehicles for the purpose of pursuing the 
investigations. Thus, the accused submitted the 
certificates of analysis should be excluded and 
acquittals entered. 
The trial judges ruled there was no s.10(a) breach, 
finding that even though they were not expressly 
told of the reasons for their detention, the accuseds 
were informed of the reason by the circumstances of 
the detention. The certificates were admitted and 
both accused were convicted of over 80mg%.
Both accuseds then appealed to the British Columbia 
Supreme Court and the appeals were heard together. 
They submitted the breath demand was invalid 
because the police officers failed to inform them of 
the reason for their detentions; investigation of 
impaired driving. The appeal judge rejected the 
appeals. 
In Justice Edwards’ opinion, it was not necessary for 
the police to specifically inform a suspect of the 
reasons for detention if it could be inferred from 
the circumstances that a suspect understood the 
basis for his detention. In these cases, there was 
evidence for the trial judge to conclude that the 
circumstances were such that the accuseds 
understood the reasons for their detention; they 
were “suspected of impaired driving and the police 
were pursuing an investigation based on that 
suspicion.” There were no Charter breaches and the 
certificates were admissible. The accuseds’ appeals 
were dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
VATICAN RELEASES DRIVERS’ 
TEN COMMANDMENTS
In June, the Holy See Press Office 
at the Vatican released a document 
entitled "Guidelines for the 
Pastoral Care of the Road." Cardinal 
Martino expressed the view that 
the "Church and State, each in its 
own field, must work to create a generalized public 
awareness on the question of road safety and 
promote, using all possible means...an adequate 
education among drivers, travelers and pedestrians." 
The document makes 84 statements about driving 
including, “Cars particularly lend themselves to being 
used by their owners to show off, and as a means for 
outshining other people and arousing a feeling of 
envy. People thus identify themselves with their cars 
and project assertion of their egos onto them. When 
we praise our cars we are, in fact, praising ourselves, 
because they belong to us and, above all, we drive 
them. Many motorists, including the not so young, 
boast with great pleasure of records broken and high 
speeds achieved, and it is easy to see that they 
cannot stand being considered as bad drivers, even 
though they may acknowledge that they are”. 
And, “It is quite common when accidents occur to 
blame the state of the road surface, a mechanical 
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problem or environmental conditions. However, it 
should be underlined that the vast majority of car 
accidents are the result of serious and unwarranted 
carelessness – if not downright stupid and arrogant 
behaviour by drivers or pedestrians – and are 
therefore due to the human factor. 
The “Drivers’ Ten Commandments” are listed as 
follows:
I You shall not kill.
II The road shall be for you a means of 
communion between people and not 
of mortal harm.
III Courtesy, uprightness and prudence 
will help you deal with unforeseen 
events.
IV Be charitable and help your 
neighbour in need, especially victims 
of accidents.
V Cars shall not be for you an 
expression of power and domination, 
and an occasion of sin.
VI Charitably convince the young and 
not so young not to drive when they 
are not in a fitting condition to do so.
VII Support the families of accident 
victims.
VIII Bring guilty motorists and their 
victims together, at the appropriate 
time, so that they can undergo the 
liberating experience of forgiveness.
IX On the road, protect the more 
vulnerable party.
X Feel responsible toward others.
“Drivers on the road should be fully aware, without 
dreading such a situation, that an accident may 
occur at any time. Despite the generally high quality 
of today’s roads in developed countries, it is foolish 
to drive “thoughtlessly” as if such dangers did not 
exist. Our attitude when driving should be the same 
as if we were using dangerous tools, and therefore 
being very careful.” - Guidelines for the Pastoral 
Care of the Road                                          Source: www.vatican.va
WAITING DRIVER DID NOT 
RELINQUISH CARE & CONTROL
R. v. Lequereux, 2007 BCSC 845
The accused caused a rear-end traffic 
collision, turned off his car, got out and 
waited for police to arrive. A police 
officer attended the scene, performed 
investigatory tasks and identified the accused as the 
driver. He was standing beside his car with his keys 
and two witnesses at the scene were able to identify 
him as the driver. The officer served a ticket on the 
accused followed by a request for an approved 
screening device (ASD) breath sample. He failed the 
ASD test, which occurred 35 minutes after the 
accident, and a breathalyzer test was subsequently 
performed at the police detachment. He blew over 
the legal limit and was charged.
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the trial 
judge excluded the results of the breathalyzer test 
based on the ASD failure. In the judge’s view the 
accused had relinquished care and control when he 
turned off his car, got out, and waited for police; 
therefore the demand for the breath sample at the 
roadside and the breathalyzer sample at the 
detachment violated the accused’s Charter rights. 
The Crown appealed to the British Columbia Supreme 
Court.
The appeal judge found the trial judge erred. In 
Justice Russell’s view, turning the car off, getting 
out, and waiting for police was only part of the 
evidence in assessing care and control. There was no 
evidence the vehicle could not be driven and the 
accused retained the keys on his person. 
Furthermore, a “police officer need not actually 
observe the person upon whom the demand is made to 
be in care and control of the motor vehicle at the 
time the demand is made.” The words “has care and 
control” found in s.254(2) of the Criminal Code, the 
provision that allows for ASD demands, is to be given 
past signification. The appeal judge found the 
accused had retained care and control of his vehicle, 
the demand for a breath sample was lawful, and the 
certificate of analysis admissible. The matter was 
remitted to Provincial Court for a rehearing.
Complete case available at www.provincialcourt.bc.ca
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INVESTIGATIVE NECESSITY 
NOT REQUIRED FOR ORGANIZED 
CRIME WIRETAPS
R. v. Doiron, 2007 NBCA 41
Following a pub fire causing about four 
million dollars in damage the arsonist 
pled guilty and cooperated with police. 
He told police that the accused, a 
lawyer, offered him $35,000 if he refused to testify 
against an owner of the pub who the arsonist claimed 
hired him to set the pub on fire. The police sought a 
judicial authorization allowing them to record the 
arsonist’s and the accused’s conversations in the 
institution the arsonist was incarcerated. As a result 
of these conversations and other evidence, the 
accused lawyer was charged with attempting to 
obstruct justice. 
At trial in the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench 
the Crown adduced evidence of several phone calls  
between the pub owner and the accused captured 
during a separate investigation. A Quebec court had 
signed a year long wiretap authorization against 40 
people alleged to be members of criminal 
organizations, such as the Hells Angels and the 
Damners. The pub owner and his brother were two of 
the named individuals. The accused was subsequently 
convicted of attempting to obstruct justice and 
sentenced to four and a half years in prison. 
The accused appealed to the New Brunswick Court of 
Appeal arguing, among other grounds, that the 
absence of an investigative necessity requirement in 
the legislative scheme for wiretaps related to 
organized crime matters makes the law unreasonable 
and therefore breached his s.8 Charter right 
protecting him from unreasonable search and 
seizure. Thus, he submitted, any order made 
pursuant to these provisions was invalid and the 
evidence inadmissible. 
Justice Deschenes, authoring the judgment of the 
New Brunswick Court of appeal, first examined the 
necessity requirements of wiretap legislation. 
Section 186(1) of the Criminal Code allows the police 
to seek an authorization to intercept private 
communications only if a judge is satisfied, among 
other things, that “other investigative procedures 
have been tried and have failed, other investigative 
procedures are unlikely to succeed, or the urgency of 
the matter is such that it would be impractical to 
carry out the investigation of the offence using only 
other investigative procedures.” This has commonly 
been labeled an “investigative necessity 
requirement.” 
Section 185(1)(h) requires the swearing officer to 
include their belief regarding this necessity 
requirement in the affidavit for the wiretap. 
However, ss.185(1.1) and 186(1.1) state that the 
necessity requirement does not apply when the 
application for authorization is in relation to a 
criminal organization or terrorism offence. In other 
words, the authorizing judge need not take the 
investigative necessity requirement into account 
when making an order for an intercept in these 
circumstances. 
Justice Deschenes concluded that the legislation was 
not rendered constitutionally invalid in so far as 
there was no investigative necessity requirement for 
intercepts related to organized crime. He stated:
…I believe that the necessity requirement is not a 
constitutional requirement for court-ordered 
electronic surveillance in cases involving organized 
crime, and that its absence from the legislation 
does not violate the right guaranteed by s. 8 of 
the Charter. [para. 33]
And further:
In short, … the investigative necessity 
requirement under s. 186(1)(b), dispensed with by 
Parliament in situations where the authorization 
sought involves criminal organizations, is not a 
constitutional requirement.   In my opinion, the 
legislative provisions allowing the state to seek 
and the authorizing judge to grant an order 
authorizing wiretapping without the need to apply 
the investigative necessity criterion are not 
unreasonable and do not violate rights guaranteed 
by s. 8 of the Charter. [para. 46]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Note-able Quote
“Good judgment is the outcome of experience ... and 
experience is the outcome of bad judgment.” - Vivian 
Fuchs
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VEHICLE FORFEITURE 
MANDATORY
R. v. Paziuk, 2007 SKCA 63
The accused was found in possession of 
241 ecstasy tablets and some marihuana 
while driving his truck. He was convicted 
of possessing a controlled substance for 
the purpose of trafficking under s.5(2) of the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) in 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court and sentenced to nine 
months in jail with a 10 year firearms prohibition. The 
sentencing judge, however, refused to order 
forfeiture of his truck, valued at about $20,000. He 
did not find the truck to be an integral part of the 
offence. The accused was not trafficking out of the 
truck but merely used it as a method of 
transportation. Furthermore, the sentencing judge 
held forfeiture would be disproportionate to the 
offence. 
The Crown appealed the sentencing judge’s order to 
release the truck to the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal. Justice Lane, stating the opinion of the 
Court, first examined the forfeiture provisions of 
the CDSA. Section 16 of the CDSA requires a court 
to order the forfeiture of property if a person has 
been convicted of a designated substance offence 
and the court is satisfied, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the property is “offence-related 
property” and an offence was committed in relation 
to that property. Section 2 of the CDSA defines 
“offence-related property” as including property 
“that is used in any manner in connection with the 
commission of a designated substance offence.”
Forfeiture is, however, limited if other innocent 
parties with a valid interest in the property apply for 
an order of restoration of the property. These 
innocent parties must be the lawful owner of the 
property or be legally entitled to possession or it if 
it were to be forfeited. If an innocent party is 
successful in their application for restoration, a 
court may, at its discretion, order the property 
returned to the innocent party.  As well, if the 
offence-related property is real property or a 
dwelling house, there is a proportionality test that 
enters into the forfeiture analysis.
In holding the truck was subject to forfeiture 
Justice Lane stated:
It is clear the truck is “offence-related 
property” in that it was used in connection with 
the commission of a designated substance 
offence. The sentencing judge failed to consider 
the definition in the Act.   Upon conviction, the 
first step he ought to have taken was to 
determine whether the property was “offence-
related property” within the meaning of the Act. 
The sentencing judge was then required, pursuant 
to s. 16, to order the property be forfeited 
because the section mandates the same, subject 
to sections 18 to 19.1, by the use of the words 
“shall...order that the property be forfeited....” 
[para. 10]
And further:
There is no reference to proportionality in regard 
to personal property and it is only in regard to 
forfeiture of real property that the judge can 
take into account the impact of an order of 
forfeiture and whether it is proportionate to the 
nature and gravity of the offence, the 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the 
offence and the criminal record of the person 
charged or convicted.
Thus, in relation to a dwelling house, the Court 
may take into account the impact that an order of 
forfeiture may have on the immediate family of 
the person charged or convicted of the offence 
provided the dwelling house was a member’s 
principal residence at the time the charge was 
laid and continues to be the member’s principal 
residence, and if the member is innocent of any 
complicity in the offence or of any collusion in 
relation to the offence (s. 19.1(4)).
Parliament clearly intended that the 
proportionality test does not apply to personal 
property under the provisions of the Act…[paras. 
13-15]
This automatic forfeiture of personal property is 
different than the forfeiture provisions of the 
Criminal Code which provide for a proportionality 
test for both personal and real property.  In allowing 
the Crown’s appeal of forfeiture and ordering the 
truck forfeited, Justice Lane stated:
…The sentencing judge had no discretion but was 
required to order forfeiture and erred in failing 
to do so.   He further erred in considering 
proportionality as a factor to be considered when 
dealing with the forfeiture of personal property. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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s.16 CDSA Legal Lingo
“offence-related property” means ... any property ... 
(a) by means of or in respect of which a designated 
substance offence is committed,
(b) that is used in any manner in connection with the 
commission of a designated substance offence, or 
(c) that is intended for use for the purpose of 
committing a designated substance offence
“designated substance offence” means (a) an offence 
under Part I, except subsection 4(1), or (b) a 
conspiracy or an attempt to commit, being an 
accessory after the fact in relation to, or any 
counselling in relation to, an offence referred to in 
paragraph (a)
s.16 CDSA FORFEITURE GRID
Property Type Forfeiture Requirements Forfeiture Status
Personal property
(moveable property 
such as lights, ballasts, 
venting, vehicles, etc.)
• Person convicted of designated 
substance offence
• Court satisfied on balance of 
probabilities
• Property is “offence-related 
property”
• Offence committed in relation 
to that property
Forfeiture mandatory
“the court shall”
Real property
(immoveable property, 
real estate, land and 
buildings erected on it)
• Person convicted of designated 
substance offence
• Court satisfied on balance of 
probabilities
• Property is “offence-related 
property”
• Offence committed in relation 
to that property
Forfeiture discretionary 
s.19.1(3) Court “may decide not to order the 
forfeiture” after considering whether the impact of 
forfeiture is disproportionate to the:
• nature & gravity of offence
• circumstances surrounding commission of 
offence
• criminal record of person convicted
s.19.1(4) If real property is a dwelling-house, 
court must also consider the impact of forfeiture 
on any member of person convicted’s immediate 
family using dwelling as principal residence and 
whether the immediate family member appears 
innocent of involvement in the offence.
Part I offences include:
• trafficking in a controlled substance, 
• possessing a controlled substance for the 
purpose of trafficking, 
• importing a controlled substance, 
• exporting a controlled substance, 
• possessing a controlled substance for the 
purpose of exporting, and 
• production of a controlled substance 
included in schedules I-IV
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POLICE CONDITIONAL RELEASE: 
ATTACKING CONDITIONS ON A 
BREACH CHARGE
There are essentially three options available 
to the police after an arrest is made. First, 
they may release the arrestee without 
conditions. Second, they may hold the 
arrestee in custody and detain for a bail 
hearing before a court. Or third, the police 
themselves may release the arrestee with  
conditions.  
The Criminal Code allows police officers to release 
persons from custody who have been arrested with 
or without warrant. Section 503(2) provides 
authority for police to conditionally release, by way 
of a promise to appear or a recognizance, an arrestee 
not brought before a justice. In addition, the police 
officer may require that the person enter into an 
undertaking with one or more of the following 
conditions:
(a) to remain within a territorial jurisdiction 
specified in the undertaking;
(b) to notify the peace officer or another person 
mentioned in the undertaking of any change in 
his or her address, employment or occupation;
(c) to abstain from communicating, directly or 
indirectly, with any victim, witness or other 
person identified in the undertaking, or from 
going to a place specified in the undertaking, 
except in accordance with the conditions 
specified in the undertaking;
(d) to deposit the person's passport with the peace 
officer or other person mentioned in the 
undertaking;
(e) to abstain from possessing a firearm and to 
surrender any firearm in the possession of the 
person and any authorization, licence or 
registration certificate or other document 
enabling that person to acquire or possess a 
firearm;
(f) to report at the times specified in the 
undertaking to a peace officer or other person 
designated in the undertaking;
(g) to abstain from
(i) the consumption of alcohol or other 
intoxicating substances, or
(ii) the consumption of drugs except in 
accordance with a medical prescription; or
(h) to comply with any other condition specified in 
the undertaking that the peace officer or 
officer in charge considers necessary to ensure 
the safety and security of any victim of or 
witness to the offence.
There is very little case law in this area, but the case 
law that does exist appears to limit the police powers 
of release, unlike a justice’s power which is relatively 
broad. However, there seems to be two different 
views on whether an accused can attack the 
conditions of release at a trial on charges of 
breaching a condition. Some courts have ruled that an 
accused can challenge the legitimacy of a police 
undertaking in an effort to impeach the 
effectiveness of a condition, while other courts have 
ruled that that rule against collateral attack applies 
to police undertakings, as part of the judicial 
process, like it does to court orders. 
Rule Against Collateral Attack
The rule against collateral attack was described by 
Justice McIntrye in R. v. Wilson, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 594 
as follows:  
It has long been a fundamental rule that a court 
order, made by a court having jurisdiction to make 
it, stands and is binding and conclusive unless it is 
set aside on appeal or lawfully quashed. It is also 
well settled in the authorities that such an order 
may not be attacked collaterally and a collateral 
attack may be described as an attack made in 
proceedings other than those whose specific 
object is the reversal, variation, or nullification of 
the order or judgment. 
In short, once a court order is made its integrity 
cannot be impeached nor can it be overturned in a 
proceeding other than within the original action or an 
appeal from it. A “direct attack”, on the other hand, 
is an attempt to amend, correct, reform, or vacate a 
judgment in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
Collateral Attack Permissible?
In R. v. Khan, [2003] O.J. No. 5301 (OntCJ) an 
officer in charge released a person with the 
condition that he “not to be in the front seat of any 
vehicle.” This condition was purportedly authorized 
under s.503(2.1)(h) of the Criminal Code. He was 
subsequently found by police sitting in the front seat 
of his car in the parking lot of his residence.
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The Crown argued that the “victim” to the offence 
could be any member of the public and the condition 
was therefore authorized under subsection (h). It 
was also submitted that the conditions were sensible 
and in the interests of public safety. Justice Pringle 
of the Ontario Court of Justice, however, concluded 
that the release powers of the officer in charge 
must be strictly interpreted. In this particular case, 
condition (h) “does not include reference to potential 
victims or a broad concern for public safety.” The 
judge stated:
When I consider the history of this amendment 
to the Criminal Code in conjunction with the 
scheme set out for judicial interim release, I am 
fortified in my conclusion that a specific, narrow 
interpretation of s. 503(2.1)(h) is appropriate. 
Each of the provisions in 503(2.1)(a) through (g) 
are very narrow, including such conditions as 
depositing a passport, abstaining from 
communicating with a specific victim or witness, 
reporting to the police, or the like. The only 
provision that might be broadly read is the one 
that is in issue here, which permits the officer to 
specify "any condition" that he or she considers 
necessary to ensure the safety and security of 
any victim of or witness to the offence. [para 15]
And further:
A specific and limited power of the officer-in-
charge to release a person charged with an 
offence fits within the scheme that Parliament 
has enacted regarding judicial interim release. 
While the scheme requires early release on 
specific conditions whenever possible, it does not 
purport to give to police officers unfettered 
discretion to decide how to protect the public 
interest. Police officers are not judicial officers, 
and they do not exercise the same powers as a 
justice of the peace or a judge for the purpose of 
release. According to the scheme of release set 
out in the Code, if there are broad concerns for 
the public interest, the person charged cannot be 
released by a peace officer or officer-in-charge, 
and must be taken before a justice: see section 
497(1.1) and 498(1.1). [para. 19]
In finding the condition not authorized under 
s.503(2.1), the judge acquitted the accused of 
breaching his undertaking.
Similarly, in R. v. Skordas, 2001 ABPC 118, the 
accused was released on numerous offences, 
including two drug offences contrary to s.5(2) of the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. His 
undertaking included conditions “not to be in 
possession of any cell phone or pager or with any 
person who had a cell phone or pager.” He was 
charged with failing to comply with his undertaking 
after a cell phone was found in his residence. Crown 
Counsel argued that subsections 503(2.1)(c) and (h) 
allowed this condition. Justice Allen of the Alberta 
Provincial Court, however, found there was no 
authority for police to issue such a condition. He held:
In my view, the emphasis in s. 503(2.1)(c) is on 
protection of the victim, witness or other person 
identified in the undertaking. The condition in the 
case at bar has not been directed to protect 
named individuals of this nature. Doubtless, a 
byproduct of such a condition would be to prevent 
the accused from any reversion to the alleged 
drug trafficking which led to the undertaking. 
However, this is an incidental consequence and not 
one that conforms with s. 503(2.1)(c). 
The basket clause found in s. 503(2.1)(h) does not 
support the condition either. Certainly, the 
section provides that "any other condition" can be 
put in an undertaking; but, that wide phrase is 
narrowed considerably by the entire context of 
that subsection (h). The context is "that the 
peace officer or officer in charge considers 
necessary to ensure the safety and security of 
any victim or witness". So, this section is also 
directed toward the protection of specific named 
persons. Also, it is specifically referable to safety 
and security concerns. For similar reasons, as set 
out in my analysis above of the other subsection, 
the cell phone condition is not directed toward the 
end of protecting a victim or witness. Nor is it, on 
its face, done for safety and security of those 
persons. [paras. 9-10]
The judge found the cell phone prohibition condition 
invalid and the accused was acquitted.
Collateral Attack Impermissible? 
In R. v. L.Y. [2002] N.W.T.J. No. 90 (NWTCrt) the 
accused was arrested for break and entering a post 
office which occurred at about 3 am. He was released 
on a Promise to Appear and a police issued 
undertaking with a curfew. He was then subsequently 
charged with breaching the police imposed curfew 
but attacked its legitimacy in the Territorial Court 
of the Northwest Territories. The judge held that 
the accused could not mount a collateral attack 
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against the undertaking issued by the police. In 
concluding that the rule against collateral attack 
applies to undertakings entered into before peace 
officers and officers in charge, Justice Bruser 
stated:
Peace officers have statutory powers given to 
them by parliament. Those powers may be 
exercised by a peace officer as part of the lawful 
process of the administration of justice and, I 
add, a necessary part of it; otherwise, people such 
as this young offender would necessarily have to 
be detained in custody until they could be dealt 
with before a Justice of the Peace or Judge 
either by personal attendance or by another 
means of doing so.
The applicable provisions of section 499 and 
section 503 were made by parliament so that 
people like [the accused] could be swiftly released 
back into the custody of their parents, instead of 
being detained and brought before a Justice of 
the Peace or Judge. [paras. 38-39]
And further:
The rationale behind the rule [against collateral 
attack] is a powerful one. It serves to maintain 
the rule of law. It serves to preserve the 
reputation of the administration of justice. The 
Supreme Court of Canada has not said that it only 
preserves the reputation of courts. It has not 
said that the powerful rationale is only to 
maintain judicial process. If it had meant that, 
the Supreme Court of Canada would have said so. 
[para. 41]
The accused was convicted of breaching his 
undertaking. 
In  R. v. Ciupak, [2003] O.J. No. 4146 (OntCJ) the 
accused was arrested for breaching his judicial 
interim release by driving an ATV on a highway even 
though he had a condition not to drive a motor 
vehicle. He was then released on a police undertaking 
with a condition “not to operate any motor vehicle.” 
The accused brought a motion that the condition “not 
to operate any motor vehicle” was not valid. In the 
Ontario Court of Justice the court found the 
condition imposed may have been appropriate for a 
judicial officer to make, but was “not one 
envisaged…under the ambit of the legislation on a 
promise to appear.” Judge Palmer stated:
…Section 503(2.1)(h) states, after a listing of 
specific authority to do specific things in an 
undertaking or a release on a promise to appear, it 
says "to comply with any other condition specified 
in the undertaking that the peace officer of 
officer in charge considers necessary to ensure 
the safety and security of any victim of or witness 
to the offence". The Court has to remind itself 
that the words of the Criminal Code ought to be 
interpreted strictly and it is abundantly evident 
from the words and I think quite clear from the 
wording, that that authority to impose a condition 
under that particular section requires the 
necessity of ensuring the safety and security of 
any victim or witness to the offence. 
I am quite prepared to find as fact of the motion 
that the officer believed in his own mind that the 
condition he imposed was appropriate because of 
the circumstances of the offence for which he 
was releasing the defendant. I do find, however 
that paragraph h does not warrant the term that 
was placed in the promise to appear. While I find 
the officer did it with no malice, in thinking he was 
doing the right thing, the Court must interpret 
these criminal statutes by the words that are 
there and in my view the condition that was 
imposed on the promise to appear, does not fit 
within the definition of section eight, nor indeed 
within the conditions of any of the other 
subsections. [paras. 3-4]
The breach charge was dismissed, but the Crown 
appealed the ruling to the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice ([2004] O.J. No. 3054 (OntSCJ)). Justice 
Marchand, relying on R. v. L.Y., concluded the lower 
court erred. He found the judge should not have 
embarked on an enquiry as to whether the condition 
imposed by police was valid. In his view, it was not 
permissible for a court to examine the legality of a 
condition given the rule against collateral attack. 
Rather, the Criminal Code proscribed a procedure to 
change a condition of release under s.503(2.1). 
Changing a Condition
Under s.503(2.1) a person subject to a police 
undertaking can apply to a justice to replace the 
order with a judicial undertaking. Of course, the 
justice or judge is not bound by the original 
conditions imposed by police and may change, add to, 
or remove conditions the court deems necessary. 
This process can be engaged any time before or at an 
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appearance on the Promise to Appear. Section 
503(2.2) reads as follows:
If the prosecutor wants to change or add a condition 
they may also apply before or at the appearance for 
a judicial undertaking under s.503(2.3).  
Conclusion
It appears the law is unsettled on whether police 
conditions can be challenged at a trial on a breach 
charge. Some courts seem to say that it can be done 
while others take the position that a collateral attack 
cannot be made. Nonetheless, officers should 
carefully consider the circumstances of an offence 
and the offender and tailor the release conditions 
accordingly.  
‘IN SERVICE’ 
LEGAL ROAD TEST ANSWERS
1. (a) True—see R. v. Doiron (at p. 21 of this 
publication). 
2. (b) False—see R. v. Doell (at p. 12 of this 
publication). The reason for the stop must be 
related to highway traffic matters (such as 
checking licences, sobriety, vehicle condition, 
etc).  
3. (a) True—see R. v. Paziuk (at p. 22 of this 
publication). There is no requirement to consider 
proportionality for personal “offence-related 
property” under the CDSA.
4. (b) False—see R. v. Paziuk (at p. 22 of this 
publication). The Criminal Code provisions for 
personal “offence-related property” forfeiture 
requires a proportionality assessment.
5. (a) True—see R. v. Blake  (at p. 29 of this 
publication). 
S.503(2.2) Criminal Code
A person who has entered into any undertaking under 
section 2.1 may, at any time before or at his or her 
appearance pursuant to a Promise to Appear or 
recognizance, apply to a Justice for an order under 
subsection 515(1) to replace his or her undertaking, and 
section 515 applies with such modification as the 
circumstances require to such a person.
17th Annual
Abbotsford Police 
Challenge Run
Saturday September 22, 2007
Register Early and Save!
The Abbotsford Police Challenge is committed to 
being a family oriented event and for those who 
don’t run there is a 5 km fun run/walk route so no one 
is excluded from participating. The Police Challenge 
Run began as a Fund Raiser for the Law Enforcement 
Torch Run for Special Olympics 16 years ago. Today 
it has grown to be one of the more prominent 
community events supporting three charities. 
LOCATION
Abbotsford Civic Plaza, adjacent to Abbotsford 
Police Department, 2838 Justice Way, Abbotsford, 
BC.
RACE TIME
Both events start at 9:00 am. Warm-up led by Apollo 
Athletic Club at 8:30 am,  Civic Plaza.
ROUTE
The 10km route is a test of your endurance that 
includes a 1 km hill while the 5km fun run route is a 
single flat loop.
www.abbotsfordpolice.org
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TIMIDITY: 
6TH DEGREE BLACK BELT?
Insp. Kelly Keith, Atlantic Police Academy
How is it that someone that is a 6th
degree black belt in karate comes 
into a use of force class and shows 
one of the highest levels of timidity 
amongst all recruits?  I recall a student who came into 
use of force classes and was downright cocky about 
his ability and openly told anyone that would listen 
that he held a 6th degree black belt in Karate.  When 
he was put through reality-based training where 
recruits are hit and yelled at, he folded his tent and 
became prey.  
Let’s get something straight – I think karate and 
many other point fighting arts are excellent activities 
and great exercises.  However, this being said, I also 
understand that a student that trains in these arts is 
not preparing themselves for a real fight.  To make 
this jump, one must stress inoculate, gradually expose 
themselves to the reality of a real fight where 
punches and kicks are not for points, but for keeps.  
Fancy kicks and punches generally do not work, and 
there is no referee to stop and start things.  I am 
sure any of us who went to the skating rinks and 
played pick-up hockey know of many people who were 
great at this type of hockey but could not duplicate 
these skills in true game conditions.
Some thoughts: 
• Fancy techniques look great, but basic ones work.  
Complicated moves fall apart when someone is 
punching you in the face.
• Are your moves strength dependant?  Strength 
dependant moves are great if we get to pick our 
opponents. However, in law enforcement, this  
unfortunately is not the case.  There are no weight 
classes, rules to prevent injury, nor referees in our 
confrontations.  We must attempt to work on 
techniques that do not rely on brute strength.
• One size does not fit all. Anyone who knows me 
knows this is my pet peeve in how we sometimes 
like to train law enforcement officers.  This is 
downright wrong and does not stand the reality 
test in any way, shape, or form.  We must work on 
techniques that fit our individual strengths, and 
physical attributes, not the ones the instructor is 
comfortable teaching.
• Do the techniques work on dynamic attacks or just 
when you have a compliant opponent who leaves 
their hand out after throwing a punch?  Reality is 
taken out of the situation if the opponent is 
working on the same moves you are and knows what 
you are going to be doing so they can block it.  In 
a real fight we generally do not know what our 
opponent is going to strike us with.  Steven Seagal 
wrist joint locks look awesome in movies – ever 
tried them when someone is not leaving his hand 
out or punching you with their other hand?
• Will your techniques work in different 
environments? It is a very good thing to have a 
plan. If you are not able to work around obstacles 
such as locked doors, small hallways, tables, hills, 
snow, etc. you will lose in real life.  To win you must 
be able to adapt to all conditions and it cannot 
faze you.
• Are your techniques re-active to a specific attack 
method?  Real fights generally have a flow to them 
that encompass different ranges and different 
tactics.  We have to get away from only teaching 
an officer to do one thing if the opponent does a 
certain attack in a certain way.  If all you do is 
train this way, you’ll lose.   Good fighters either 
consciously or un-consciously understand 
principle-based fighting, which is all based around 
the principles of the different ranges and tactics.  
If an opponent moves his foot one way instead of 
another, it may mean you push rather than pull, or  
the suspect got tired of punching so he charged 
you. No big deal! The tactic just changed so must 
we!!!
We must train ourselves and others in law 
enforcement this same way.  For example, we cannot 
train a police officer to win a gunfight by standing 
still and shooting at a piece of paper. If we do, we are 
teaching basic gun handling skills which is no 
different than stick handling in hockey. It is only one 
of the fundamental skills, which we must understand 
and perform before moving on.  If we stop our 
firearms training at the marksmanship level are we 
truly preparing the officer for a gunfight?  I suggest 
that teaching an officer to stand still and hit a paper 
target is even farther from reality than training the 
officer to kick and punch a bag. At least a bag 
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supplies resistance.  If we stop our gun training at 
marksmanship - teaching to stand still, taking your 
time, not seeking cover or getting out of the way of 
a bullet or suspect running at us with a knife -  we are 
indeed hampering the officer’s ability to win, which 
should be everyone’s ultimate goal. It is not 
uncommon to see timidity in point fighters such as 
karate; nor is it uncommon to see good marksman who 
are timid.  
Tactical firearms and reality-based training is a large 
piece of a law enforcement officer’s training that we 
must keep expanding.  With reality-based training, 
we are training an officer to be in a gunfight or a 
physical altercation – WITH PROPER SAFETY PRE-
CAUTIONS IN PLACE). There is nothing real about 
it if we don’t at some time during their training 
exchange gunfire or strikes.  In reality-based 
training I do not allow the officer to be tested to die!  
I don’t need to train an officer how to die, we can 
learn that all by ourselves, we do it every week (no 
disrespect meant!!).  We need to train officers to 
fight and win even though they are shot or struck!!!
About the Author - Insp. Kelly Keith is a 20 year 
veteran of law enforcement. He presently teaches 
Physical Training, Use of Force and Tactical Firearms 
to Corrections, Law and Security, Conservation 
Officers and Police Cadets at the Atlantic Police 
Academy. Kelly is a second degree black belt in Jiu-
Jitsu and a Certified Personal Trainer, Strength and 
Conditioning Instructor, and a Certified Sports 
Nutrition Specialist. He can be reached by email at 
KKeith@pei.sympatico.ca 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Police Decision Making
“This is a situation wherein the police were 
reacting to an event unfolding at that very 
moment. In such circumstances, there is a 
danger that post-event analysis by armchair 
quarterbacks in the bar and bench will 
apply unrealistically high standards of perfection to situations 
were split-second decisions have to be made.” - Yukon 
Territorial Court Chief Judge Faulkner, R. v. Blake, 2005 
YKTC 62.
NO PRIVACY INTEREST IN 
SHOES REMOVED FROM 
ARRESTEE
R. v. Blake, 2007 YKCA
The accused was arrested by police for 
a property related offence and 
transported to cells. Before being 
placed in a cell, the officer took some 
of the accused’s clothing, including his shoes, as was 
standard police practice. The officer looked at the 
soles of the shoes, noticing they were similar to a 
shoe impression left at a computer store break and 
enter. The officer had recently viewed an email 
where a photograph of a shoe impression that had 
been left at the scene of a break and enter at a 
computer shop was attached. He compared the 
photograph to the shoes and believed they were the 
same.  The officer then seized the shoes and placed 
them into an exhibit locker so they could be examined 
by the police identification section. 
At trial in Yukon Territorial Court on a charge of 
breaking and entering the computer store, the 
accused argued his rights under s.8 of the Charter 
were violated when the police seized his shoes and 
and examined the soles. The evidence, he submitted, 
should be excluded under s.24(2). The trial judge 
agreed that the “search” was unreasonable, but 
admitted the evidence any way. In his view, the 
accused was in lawful custody and had a diminished 
expectation of privacy. The officer acted in good 
faith, had reasonable grounds, and the evidence was 
important to the break and enter case. The accused’s 
application to exclude the evidence was dismissed 
and he was convicted of break and enter.
The accused then appealed his conviction to the 
Yukon Court of Appeal contending the trial judge 
erred in admitting the evidence of footwear 
impressions. He submitted that the officer was not 
acting in good faith because he was on a fishing 
expedition when he turned the shoes over to look at 
the soles. As well, he suggested the soles were not in 
“plain view”, the officer could only obtain the 
evidence through a proper “investigation,” and the 
Charter breach was serious; it was deliberate, wilful, 
and flagrant.  The Crown, on the other hand, 
contended that the examination of the shoe soles 
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was not a “search” for Charter purposes. They were 
in the lawful possession of the police and the visual 
observation and comparison of 
the soles did not engage s.8 
because the accused had little 
or no privacy expectation in his 
effects when he was arrested.
In finding that the accused did 
not have a privacy expectation in 
his shoes and therefore s.8 was 
not triggered, Chief Justice 
Finch stated:
In my opinion, the [accused] here had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the tread on 
the sole of his shoes. Counsel for the [accused] 
clearly conceded that [the officer] had lawful 
authority to require the [accused] to remove his 
shoes in the interests of his own safety. [The 
accused] was wearing the shoes in public at the 
time of his arrest in relation to the Yukon Inn 
offence. [The officer’s] examination of the shoes, 
after they had been removed from the accused, 
did not affect the [accused’s] bodily integrity, nor 
the autonomy or dignity of his person. Once 
removed, the shoes were out of his control. As he 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
soles of his shoes, s. 8 was not engaged. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and the 
conviction upheld.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s note: Judges of the Yukon Court of Appeal 
are judges from the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal. The Yukon Court of Appeal sits once a year in 
Whitehorse while other Yukon appeals are also heard 
at other British Columbia court locations.
EXPERIENCE COUNTS IN 
REASONABLE GROUNDS 
ANALYSIS
R. v. Juan, 2007 BCCA 351
A police officer arranged by telephone 
to purchase nine ounces of cocaine 
from a drug trafficker known as “Joey” 
for $8,100 in a shopping mall parking 
lot. While the officer waited in her vehicle in the 
parking lot, the trafficker arrived with two 
“Once removed, the 
shoes were out of his 
control. As he had no 
reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the soles of 
his shoes, s. 8 was not 
engaged.” 
passengers, including the accused who was seated in 
the front passenger seat. The trafficker went to the 
officer's vehicle and showed her the cocaine.  
The officer then exited her vehicle 
purportedly to obtain money from the trunk, 
when she signalled other officers who 
converged on the scene.   The trafficker ran 
and threw a plastic bag, but he was taken to 
the ground and handcuffed.  
Four other officers went to the trafficker’s 
vehicle to deal with the passengers.   The 
accused was forcefully removed from the vehicle and 
searched.   Police found a plastic baggie in his left 
front pants pocket containing nine grams of cocaine 
packaged in various ways with a street value of 
approximately $1,040. 
At trial the trial judge ruled the accused’s arrest was 
unlawful. The judge found that the police collectively 
had the subjective belief he was committing an 
indictable offence while sitting in the front 
passenger seat of the vehicle, however he held the 
grounds for arrest were not objectively justified. 
The judge then went on to conclude the detention 
was a lawful investigative detention but that only a 
pat-down search was permissible and the search that 
occurred went beyond the legitimate scope of a 
search incident to investigative detention. The 
search was therefore unreasonable under s.8 of the 
Charter and the evidence was excluded under 
s.24(2). 
The Crown appealed to the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal arguing the arrest was lawful and the search 
that followed was also legal. Justice Thackray, 
writing the opinion for the unanimous appeal court, 
agreed. He first discussed the requirements for a 
lawful arrest and noted several principles, including:
• Reasonable grounds has both a subjective and 
objective aspect;
• Subjectively, the officer must have reasonable 
grounds on which to base an arrest. This 
subjective element is the officer’s own personal 
belief; and 
• Objectively, a reasonable person standing in the 
shoes of the officer would also believe that 
reasonable grounds for making an arrest exist. 
The reasonable person is presumed to have the 
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knowledge and experience of a 
knowledgeable and experienced 
police officer. 
In this case the officers testifying had 
considerable experience. Their evidence 
was that in their opinion anyone 
travelling in the trafficker’s vehicle was 
involved in the transaction at some level 
such as security, being a lookout, 
holding the drugs, or being the supplier 
of the drugs. The officers stressed 
that this drug transaction was 
significant; it involved the sale of nine ounces of 
cocaine valued at $8,100 to an undercover officer. 
In holding that “no reasonable persons put in the 
shoes of the officers could logically come to a 
conclusion other than that held by the officers,” 
Justice Thackray stated:
The test set forth is to establish that "a 
reasonable person, standing in the shoes of the 
police officer, would have believed that reasonable 
and probable grounds existed to make the arrest."  
This does not mean that the beliefs of police 
officers are not necessarily objective.   However, 
in that their conclusions might be perceived to 
have a bias or prejudice they must be subjected to 
a test of whether a reasonable person standing in 
the officers' shoes would have come to the same 
conclusion. 
[………]
In the case at bar the judge concluded that the 
officers' testimony supported the subjective 
grounds, but not the objective grounds.  He based 
this on a finding that the arrest was "simply 
because [the accused] was a passenger in the 
vehicle."   That conclusion overlooked both the 
experience of the officers and, most significantly, 
their knowledge as to the customs of the illegal 
drug trade and their testimony with respect to the 
transaction in question.   Matters of security 
involving protection of the principal were known by 
the officers to be important and often resulted in 
other people accompanying the principal.   The 
officers knew this was a high level illegal 
commercial drug transaction and that principals do 
not take "innocents" along to testify against them 
in the case of an arrest, but rather only people who 
are trusted.   The officers were aware that [the 
accused] was involved in such a "purposeful trip." 
[paras. 27-28]
The police subjectively 
believed the accused was 
involved in an illegal drug 
transaction and had the 
objective grounds to support 
the arrest. The search that 
followed was incidental to 
the lawful arrest and the 
evidence was admissible. The 
accused’s acquittal was set 
aside and a new trial was 
ordered.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
UNFOLDING EVENTS PROVIDED 
SUFFICIENT CORROBORATION 
OF RELIABLE INFORMER’s TIP
R. v. Silver, 2007 YKCA 4
A drug officer received information 
from a reliable informant that the 
accused would be driving a silver 
Subaru with a black hood and make drug 
deliveries to “crack shacks” and hotels in 
Whitehorse. The officer knew the accused was 
connected to the drug subculture and had previously 
seen him drive a Honda with a black hood, registered 
to a known local cocaine dealer. As well, the officer 
knew the accused was wanted on an outstanding 
arrest warrant for cultivating marihuana in British 
Columbia. 
Later that day, while looking for the vehicle, the 
officer saw a silver vehicle with a black hood 
travelling toward downtown where the known 
cocaine-vending sites were located. The officer could 
not identify the driver but radioed ahead to have the 
vehicle stopped by a uniformed officer. The vehicle 
was stopped and after it was confirmed that the 
accused was the driver, he was arrested for the 
offence of possession for the purpose of trafficking 
and searched. A pat down search at the roadside 
revealed a loaded .45 calibre handgun. A short time 
later, at the detachment, a strip search revealed nine 
packages of crack cocaine weighing 59.3 grams 
hidden in the accused’s underwear that had been 
modified with a storage pocket.
“The test set forth is to establish 
that "a reasonable person, 
standing in the shoes of the police 
officer, would have believed that 
reasonable and probable grounds 
existed to make the arrest."  This 
does not mean that the beliefs of 
police officers are not necessarily 
objective.”
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At trial in Yukon Territorial Court the judge ruled 
that the officer receiving the tip had articulable 
cause to direct other officers to stop the vehicle and 
detain its occupants after he saw the vehicle fitting 
the description. He also found the police had 
reasonable grounds to arrest the accused and 
conduct the search. The accused was not arbitrarily 
detained nor unreasonably searched. The evidence 
was admissible and the accused was convicted of 
possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, 
possessing a loaded firearm without a licence, and 
possessing a firearm with its serial number removed.
The accused appealed his conviction to the Yukon 
Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that the police did 
not have reasonable grounds to stop the vehicle and 
make the arrest and search. He conceded that the 
tip was received from a proven reliable informant, 
but submitted the information was conclusory only, 
the police should have obtained more detail,  and they 
did not corroborate the tip in any form. 
Justice Low, stating the opinion for the unanimous 
Yukon Court of Appeal, found the circumstances as 
they unfolded provided sufficient corroboration to 
meet the reasonable grounds standard. He stated:
In my opinion, the combination of what the police 
knew about the [accused], the substance of the 
information given by the informer, as well as that 
person’s proven reliability, the distinctive 
appearance of the vehicle the [accused] was said 
to be driving regardless of its manufacture, and 
the direction in which the vehicle was being driven 
when first seen, combined, once it was determined 
that the [accused] was the driver, to render the 
search of the [accused] and the seizure of the 
contraband reasonable.   It would have been 
advisable for [the drug officer] to have obtained 
from the informer a little detail as to how he knew 
about the [accused’s] activity.  But the sighting of 
the [accused] in a vehicle that matched the 
distinctive feature of the vehicle description 
provided by the informer, plus the direction of 
travel, amounted to sufficient corroboration of 
the informer’s report to meet the test in Debot. 
As the trial judge noted, this was a developing 
situation.  There was no time to obtain a warrant.  
In my opinion, the arrest, search and seizure were 
all objectively and subjectively based upon 
reasonable and probable grounds….[paras. 13-14]
The trial judge did not err in applying the law to the 
facts he found and ruling the critical evidence 
admissible. The appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Reliability of Informant Information
“In my view, there are at least three 
concerns to be addressed in weighing 
evidence relied on by the police to justify 
a warrantless search. First, was the 
information predicting the commission of a 
criminal offence compelling? Second, where that information 
was based on a “tip” originating from a source outside the 
police, was that source credible? Finally, was the information 
corroborated by police investigation prior to making the 
decision to conduct the search? I do not suggest that each 
of these factors forms a separate test. Rather, ...the “totality 
of the circumstances” must meet the standard of 
reasonableness. Weakness in one area may, to some extent, 
be compensated by strengths in the other two.” - Supreme 
Court of Canada Justice Wilson, R. v. Debot, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 
1140. 
BUY THE BOOK
s.254(3) Criminal Code
Where a peace officer believes on 
reasonable and probable grounds that a 
person is committing, or at any time within 
the preceding three hours has committed, as 
a result of the consumption of alcohol, an 
offence under section 253, the peace officer may, by 
demand made to that person forthwith or as soon as 
practicable, require that person to provide then or as soon 
thereafter as is practicable…such samples of the person’s 
breath as in the opinion of a qualified technician…are 
necessary to enable proper analysis to be made in order to 
determine the concentration, if any, of alcohol in the 
person’s blood, and to accompany the peace officer for the 
purpose of enabling such samples to be taken.
Note-able Quote
“There is nothing so easy to learn as experience and 
nothing so hard to apply. “ - Josh Billings
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ABORTED BREATH SAMPLE 
WOULD NOT ASSIST DEFENCE 
R. v. Melville, 2007 ONCA 520
After a proper breathalyzer demand the 
accused provided a breath sample into an 
intoxilyzer, registering a reading of 
93mg%. The qualified technician then 
waited 15 minutes, as was standard practice, and 
attempted to obtain a second sample. The instrument 
began to analyze the sample. The reading increased in 
small amounts but dropped precipitously, causing the 
technician to abort the sample, decide it was 
unsuitable, and demand a further sample.  The third 
sample yielded a reading of 103mg%, but the police 
never kept a printout of the aborted analysis. The 
accused was convicted in the Ontario Court of 
Justice on a charge of over 80mg%.
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing that the failure of the police to keep a 
printout or other record of the aborted analysis 
violated his rights under s.7 of the Charter, thereby 
invalidating the analysis of the two good samples upon 
which his conviction was based. In a unanimous 
endorsement, the appeal was dismissed. The Ontario 
Court of Appeal held:
The language of s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code … 
contemplates that a qualified technician may in 
the course of administering a test, determine that 
a sample is unsuitable in which case a demand for 
a further sample may be made under the scheme.  
In this case, the qualified technician made the 
assessment based on her training that the second 
sample provided by the [accused] was not suitable 
for analysis.   Whether she was ultimately, as a 
matter of science, right or wrong in that 
assessment is irrelevant.   Under the statutory 
scheme, she was entitled to make that assessment 
in good faith.  Her good faith was not challenged 
in this proceeding. 
Once it is accepted, as it must be on the 
authorities, that the qualified technician was 
entitled to reject the second sample as 
inadequate, the results of the partial or aborted 
analysis of that inadequate sample could not have 
potentially assisted the [accused] in any way in his 
defence on the “blowing over” charge. [references 
omitted, paras. 4-5]
The accused’s conviction stood.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
HIT & RUN: DRIVER MUST BE 
AWARE OF ACCIDENT BEFORE 
LEAVING
R. v. Noseworthy, 2007 NLCA 45
A pedestrian walking along the side of a 
road was struck a glancing blow by a 
passing vehicle that did not stop. He was 
knocked to the ground but was not 
seriously injured. Investigating police determined 
that the accused was the driver of the truck that 
struck the pedestrian. He was charged with 
dangerous driving, hit and run, and breach of 
probation. 
At trial in Newfoundland Provincial Court the accused 
denied that his truck had struck the pedestrian, 
although other evidence suggested that it had. The 
trial judge found that the accused would have been 
aware, at some point, that he had struck the 
pedestrian. The trial judge acquitted the accused of 
dangerous driving, but convicted him of hit and run 
and breach of probation. His appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Newfoundland was unsuccessful. He then 
appealed to the Newfoundland Court of Appeal.
Justice Rowe, stating the opinion of the Appeal 
Court, first noted that for a person to be convicted 
of hit and run under s.252(1)(a) of the Criminal Code
the Crown needs to prove that the person was aware 
they had been involved in an accident at the time they 
failed to stop. “If [the accused] became aware he had 
struck a person only after he had left the scene of 
the accident, then he would not be guilty of 
contravening s.252(1)(a),” said Justice Rowe.
“At some point”, the term used by the trial judge, was 
broad enough to include a time after the accused left 
the scene, such as five minutes later. By using this 
term, the trial judge made it unclear whether he was 
convicting the accused on the basis he was aware of 
the accident when he left the scene or became aware 
it after he left. Since there was evidence consistent 
with the accused being aware of the accident at the 
time he left the scene as well as evidence consistent 
with him becoming aware only after he left the scene, 
the appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
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FIREARM BLOCKADE 
CONSTITUTIONAL
R. v. Clayton & Farmer, 2007 SCC 32
Police received a 911 call at about 1:22 
am from a male located in a donut shop 
across the street from a large strip 
club. The caller, who identified himself 
by name, told police there were about 10 black males, 
casually dressed, congregating outside the strip club 
and that four of them had handguns. The caller also 
described four vehicles by colour and model (a tan 
Lexus, a black Jeep Cherokee, a black GMC Blazer, 
and a white Acura Legend) associated with the group 
of men. When asked to check, the caller confirmed 
there was still a crowd in the parking area but that 
one of the vehicles had left. The gun call was 
dispatched and police officers responded. 
The first officers on scene saw a group of men 
outside the club, but no weapons. Two officers 
positioned themselves at the parking lot’s rear exit 
at 1:26 am, intending on stopping and searching any 
vehicle and its occupants leaving the lot.  At 1:27 am 
the first vehicle—a black Jaguar—arrived, but it did 
not resemble the description of any of the reported 
associated vehicles. Police nonetheless pulled their 
car in front of it, blocking the exit. Both men were 
black—Farmer was driving and Clayton, a passenger, 
wore driving gloves on this warm night. Police told 
them they were investigating a gun call and asked 
them to step out of the vehicle. 
Clayton complied, but was evasive when questioned 
and appeared nervous, while Farmer exited with some 
reluctance-it took three requests to get him out of 
the car. An officer placed his hand on Clayton to 
direct him to the back of the car, but a struggle 
ensued and Clayton fled towards the strip club. Police 
pursued and Clayton was apprehended trying to enter 
the club. A bouncer identified him as one of the males 
having a gun. He was handcuffed and police found a 
loaded handgun in his pocket. Farmer, who remained 
at the car, was also searched. A loaded handgun was 
found tucked in the back of his pants.  Both men were 
charged with numerous firearms offences. 
At their trial in the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice both men were convicted after the judge 
ruled the evidence admissible. In his view, the initial 
brief detention of the vehicle to screen cars leaving 
the area was permissible at common law. However, 
the officers intended on searching the men from the 
moment the vehicle was stopped without having a 
reasonable and individualized suspicion they were 
involved in a crime. Continuing the detention by 
removing them from the car to search them resulted 
in their rights to be secure from arbitrary detention 
and unreasonable search violated. Despite the 
breaches, in the judge’s view the exclusion of the 
guns would bring the administration of justice into 
greater disrepute than to admit them.
Farmer and Clayton then appealed to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal. Justice Doherty, writing the 
unanimous judgment, found the Charter rights of 
both accused had been seriously infringed. There was 
neither statutory authority for the roadblock nor any 
reasonable individualized suspicion that could justify 
an investigative detention as described by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Mann. Nor was this 
a case involving a roadblock similar to the type used 
by police for highway safety matters. As such, any 
authority for the type of roadblock undertaken in 
this case would have to find mooring in the ancillary 
police power doctrine (Waterfield test). 
At common law, the ancillary power doctrine 
recognizes that police conduct interfering with a 
person’s liberty can be justified if the police were (1) 
acting in the course of their duty and (2) their 
conduct was a justifiable use of police powers 
associated to that duty. In assessing whether police 
conduct is justified a number of factors must be 
considered, including:
• the duty performed, 
• the liberty interfered with, 
• the nature and extent of the interference,
• the extent to which some interference with 
liberty is necessitated to perform the duty, and  
• the importance of the duty to the public good.
In this case, Justice Doherty held that the police 
had a duty to investigate and prevent crime and 
stopping the car was done while acting in the course 
of that duty.  However, he found the police conduct 
did not pass the second prong of the ancillary power 
doctrine—the justifiability factors. Here, the 
roadblock engaged the criminal process against the 
targets of it by determining whether the occupants 
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of a stopped vehicle were involved in criminal 
activity. The detention and searching of all vehicles 
and occupants leaving the parking area was a 
profound interference with individual autonomy and 
privacy. “Being stopped by the police, questioned 
about guns, told to exit the vehicle, and made to 
stand against the vehicle in a public place while the 
police examine the inside of the vehicle, can be a 
frightening and humiliating experience,” said Justice 
Doherty. 
Although he agreed that the use of roadblocks to 
investigate crimes and apprehend criminals might be 
a justifiable intrusion on individual liberties in some 
cases, this was not one such case. Since the police 
did not have grounds to suspect any specific person, 
a roadblock could only be justified if there were 
reasonable grounds to believe a serious crime had 
been committed and the roadblock may apprehend 
the offenders. Here, the description provided by 
the 911 caller was detailed. The perpetrators were 
described as black males, casually dressed, and the 
specific make and models of four vehicles connected 
to the men were provided. 
Rather than limiting their stops to persons in 
vehicles that resembled the description provided by 
the 911 caller, the police cast too wide a net in 
stopping all vehicles leaving the parking area without 
having reasonable grounds to believe stopping 
motorists not matching the description would result 
in apprehending the perpetrators and recovering the 
guns. Had the police narrowed or tailored their focus 
consistent with the information provided, the 
accused’s vehicle would not have been stopped and it 
would have been free to pass. 
Since the police could not justify stopping all 
vehicles under the ancillary power doctrine, the stop 
was unlawful and the accuseds were arbitrarily 
detained. Questioning them at the vehicle and the 
examination of the vehicle’s interior also violated 
their rights under s.8. However, unlike the trial 
judge, the appeal court ruled the handguns 
inadmissible as evidence. The Charter violations 
were characterized as significant. The police 
intended to stop and search all vehicles and their 
occupants. The accuseds were “entitled to proceed 
on their way [but] found themselves in a potentially 
demeaning and frightening confrontation with 
police.” The fact Clayton and Farmer were in 
possession of handguns did not minimize the 
breach—“criminals do not have different 
constitutional rights than the rest of the 
community,” said Justice Doherty.
The Court was also very critical of police training. 
Not only did the police fail to consider the relevant 
factors in assessing the ancillary power doctrine, 
they did not consider and balance the demands of 
their duties against interfering with individual 
liberties. Nor did they have an appreciation for the 
scope of their search powers. Police ignorance of the 
limits of their ancillary powers was institutional and 
related to their training. The handguns were ruled 
inadmissible, the appeal was allowed, the convictions 
were quashed, and acquittals were entered on all 
charges.
The Supreme Court Weighs In
The Crown appealed the Ontario Court of Appeal 
ruling to the Supreme Court of Canada. Although all 
nine judges allowed the appeal and reinstated the 
accuseds’ convictions, they were divided on how they 
reached that result. The majority (six judges) ruled 
that the police did not arbitrarily detain the accused 
and the resultant searches were reasonable. The 
minority (three judges) found the detentions were 
arbitrary but saved by s.1 of the Charter. They also 
found the searches were reasonable. Both the 
majority and minority did, however, recognize that it 
was important to address each stage of the police 
interaction, including the initial detention, the 
continued detention, and the searches. 
The Initial Detention
Justice Abella, writing the opinion for the majority, 
first determined whether the police were acting 
within the scope of their common law powers when 
they detained the accused. A lawful detention at 
common law, she noted, is not arbitrary. In applying 
the criteria for the Waterfield test, the majority 
agreed the police were acting in the course of their 
duty to investigate and prevent crime when they 
stopped the car, passing the first prong of the 
analysis. As for the second prong, the justifiability 
criteria, the majority parted company with Justice 
Doherty and found the police conduct in stopping all 
vehicles leaving the parking lot was a justifiable use 
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of police powers associated with their duties. 
Justice Abella wrote:
The justification for a police officer’s decision to 
detain…will depend on the “totality of the 
circumstances” underlying the officer’s suspicion 
that the detention of a particular individual is 
“reasonably necessary”.   If, for example, the 
police have particulars about the individuals said 
to be endangering the public, their right to 
further detain will flow accordingly.  As explained 
in Mann, searches will only be permitted where the 
officer believes on reasonable grounds that his or 
her safety, or that of others, is at risk.
The determination will focus on the nature of the 
situation, including the seriousness of the offence, 
as well as on the information known to the police 
about the suspect or the 
crime, and the extent to 
which the detention was 
reasonably responsive or 
tailored to these 
circumstances, including 
its geographic and 
temporal scope.   This 
means balancing the 
seriousness of the risk to 
public or individual safety 
with the liberty interests 
of members of the public 
to determine whether, 
given the extent of the 
risk, the nature of the stop is no more intrusive of 
liberty interests than is reasonably necessary to 
address the risk.
In my view, both the initial and the continuing 
detentions of Clayton and Farmer’s car were 
justified based on the information the police had, 
the nature of the offence, and the timing and 
location of the detention.
The police set up the initial stop in response to a 
911 call identifying the presence of about ten 
“black guys”, four of them with guns.  The police 
described what they were doing as setting up 
perimeter surveillance posts to secure the 
confined geographical area where the offence 
they were investigating had reportedly taken 
place.   The police had reasonable grounds to 
believe that there were several handguns in a 
public place.  This represented a serious offence, 
accompanied by a genuine risk of serious bodily 
harm to the public.   The police were entitled to 
take reasonable measures to investigate the 
offence without waiting for the harm to 
materialize and had reasonable grounds for 
believing that stopping cars emerging from this 
parking lot would be an effective way to apprehend 
the perpetrators of the serious crime being 
investigated. [references omitted, paras. 30-33]
The majority found that “requiring the police to stop 
only those vehicles described in the 911 call imposes 
an unrealistic burden on the police in this case, and 
one inconsistent with their duty to respond in a 
timely manner, at least initially, to the seriousness of 
the circumstances.” In holding that the initial 
detention was not arbitrary, Justice Abella stated:
The police had reasonable grounds to believe that 
public safety was at risk, that handguns could be 
in the possession of those leaving the parking 
area, and that stopping cars 
leaving that area could result 
in their apprehension.   The 
steps taken by the police in 
this case in stopping the car, 
based on the information they 
had, were reasonable and 
reasonably tailored to the 
information they had.
In the totality of the 
circumstances, therefore, the 
initial detention in this case 
was reasonably necessary to 
respond to the seriousness of 
the offence and the threat to the police’s and 
public’s safety inherent in the presence of 
prohibited weapons in a public place, and was 
temporally, geographically and logistically 
responsive to the circumstances known by the 
police when it was set up.   The initial stop was 
consequently a justifiable use of police powers 
associated with the police duty to investigate the 
offences described by the 911 caller and did not 
represent an arbitrary detention contrary to s. 9 
of the Charter. [paras. 40-41]
The Continued Detention
As noted, the majority concluded that the continued 
detention was lawful because the officers 
determined that Clayton and Farmer matched the 
race of the suspects in the 911 call (they were black) 
and that Clayton, a passenger, was wearing leather 
gloves on a non “glove weather” (warm) night and gave 
strange and evasive answers on being questioned. As 
“The police had reasonable grounds to 
believe that public safety was at risk, that 
handguns could be in the possession of 
those leaving the parking area, and that 
stopping cars leaving that area could 
result in their apprehension.  The steps 
taken by the police in this case in stopping 
the car, based on the information they 
had, were reasonable and reasonably 
tailored to the information they had.”
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well, the vehicle came from the scene of the 
reported crime, it was the first vehicle to leave the 
parking lot within minutes of when the crime was 
reported, and that it avoided leaving by the front 
exit, where the other officers were arriving, instead 
heading towards the rear exit. Justice Abella stated:
Taken together, these facts, objectively, gave 
rise to the reasonable suspicion that the 
occupants of the Jaguar could be in possession of 
the handguns reported in the 911 call, and that, 
as a result, the lives of the police officers and of 
the public were at risk, justifying their continued 
detention.   This constellation of circumstances 
was such that the police were required to, and 
did, respond quickly and appropriately to the 
information they had about the possession of 
guns by individuals in this particular parking lot.  
They treated the two occupants as equally likely 
to be connected to the serious crime under 
investigation.  They were reasonable in taking this 
approach once they saw that both individuals, in a 
car that had just left the crime scene, matched 
the general description they had.
I accept…that had the police stopped the vehicle 
and discovered that the occupants did not 
correspond to the description given by the 911 
caller, they would have had no reasonable grounds 
for the continued detention of the occupants.  
For example, had the caller described individuals 
who were white, the police would not have had 
reasonable grounds for the continued detention 
of non-white occupants.  On the particular facts 
of this case, however, based on their subsequent 
observations, there were reasonable grounds…for 
the police to conclude that the two occupants of 
the car they had stopped were implicated in the 
crime being investigated. [paras. 46-47]
The Searches
Searches of both the occupants were justified for 
safety reasons as an incident to their detention. 
“The search was necessarily incidental to the lawful 
investigative detention and…there was no violation of 
s.8,” said Justice Abella. 
The Minority View 
Like the majority, the minority also would allow the 
appeal and restore the accused’s convictions, albeit 
for different reasons. Justice Binnie, authoring the 
opinion for the minority, found the police had no 
particular grounds against the accused and the 
blockade, designed to stop all motorists leaving the 
strip club regardless of description, was arbitrary. 
As the minority noted, it was important to 
distinguish between what the police knew at the time 
of detention and what they knew after the detention 
when they had an opportunity to observe the 
vehicle’s occupants. Before they stopped the car, 
the police had no individualized suspicion of the 
accused or their vehicle nor did they use other 
criteria to tailor the roadblock. Instead, the 
roadblock was set-up to stop all vehicles leaving the 
strip club thus it was ruled arbitrary. These 
arbitrary detentions were, however, saved by s.1 of 
the Charter.   
In the s.1 analysis, the minority opined that “the 
protection of society from the flaunting of illegal 
handguns in a crowded public place is clearly pressing 
and substantial.” The roadblock, which would stop all 
vehicles, was also a rational response to the 911 gun 
call. Randomly stopping only some vehicles would not 
have served the purpose of the blockade. And finally, 
the blockade was properly tailored to the 
circumstances. Although it was a complete blockade, 
it was a brief imposition on motorists leaving the 
parking lot. Justice Binnie stressed the difference 
between the type of stop in this case and an 
investigative detention based on reasonable 
suspicion:
A Clayton and Farmer stop is not the same thing 
as a Mann investigative detention although it may 
(or may not) lead in that direction.  A Clayton and 
Farmer stop of all vehicles is established for 
screening purposes.  A Mann inquiry may then be 
undertaken only if reasonable grounds for 
individualized suspicion emerge.  I conclude that 
the common law at issue in this case satisfies the 
requirement of proportionality (in fact “tailored” 
is more or less a synonym for proportionality).  In 
such circumstances, anything less than a full 
blockade would not serve the purpose which has 
already been found to be pressing and 
substantial.   Moreover, for the reasons 
mentioned, the law’s salutary effects exceed its 
deleterious effects. [para. 118]
The minority ruled that the police had the power at 
common law to set up the roadblock when they have 
reasonable grounds to believe that a serious 
firearms offence was committed and that the 
roadblock may apprehend the perpetrators. Here, 
the police arrived within five minutes of the 911 call, 
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limited their roadblock to the parking lot of the 
strip club where individuals would be leaving through 
one of two available exits, and had reasonable 
grounds to believe a serious crime had been 
committed and the perpetrators might be 
apprehended by means of the roadblock. As well, the 
police were entitled to question the vehicle’s 
occupants to determine if they had information 
about the incident. A decision would then be made to 
let the vehicle go or detain it for further 
investigation if an individual suspicion (articulable 
cause) existed. This power of detention was used to 
screen cars for further inquiry.  
The minority also held the searches lawful:
As to s. 8, Mann holds that in a lawful 
detention situation the police may 
undertake a pat-down search if the 
officer believes “on reasonable 
grounds that his or her safety, or 
the safety of others, is at risk”….  
The issue on the proper scope of the 
search is clouded in this case 
because (unlike Mann) the presence 
of handguns not only constitutes a police safety 
issue but constitutes the evidence of the offence 
being investigated.  It is not possible to say here, 
as it was in Mann, that the police went too far 
when their search proceeded beyond safety 
considerations to evidence collection.   Here, the 
two purposes were intertwined and not separable.  
Nevertheless, I would affirm that after the police 
officers had observed the [accuseds] and engaged 
in conversation with them, the police had 
authority here to conduct a pat-down search 
incidental to their continued detention.  It would 
be illogical to hold that a pat-down search is 
justified where the detention relates to a non-
violent offence (as in Mann) but not where the 
police are facing serious issues of personal safety 
when responding to a gun call... Equally, it would be 
illogical to be solicitous of the safety of 
individuals who may or may not be at risk at the 
calling end of the 911 call (Godoy…) but not of the 
safety of the police who, in the course of 
roadblock duty, are putting themselves, at least 
potentially, in harm’s way.   If evidence of the 
crime emerges in the course of a valid pat-down 
search incidental to the detention for the purpose 
of police safety, the evidence will be admissible…. 
[para. 104]
Once the accused were stopped the police acquired 
grounds of reasonable individualized suspicion to 
convert the initial blockade stop into an investigative 
detention under Mann. In addition to the initial 
information police had, they determined after the 
stop that Clayton was black and was wearing gloves 
on a warm night, suggesting a concern about leaving 
fingerprints. This provided the necessary grounds 
for police to remove him from the car and search 
him. However, he bolted and was subsequently 
apprehended and searched. Clayton’s gun was found 
and was properly admissible as evidence. The search 
of Farmer was similarly reasonable, within the 
bounds of an investigative detention. Justice Binnie 
sated:
I think that it would have been foolhardy for the 
police, in the context of a gun 
call, to leave Farmer, possibly 
armed, in the car while they 
went about their business with 
Clayton.   Nor could the police 
be expected to allow Farmer 
to drive away.  If Farmer, left 
alone in the driver’s seat, had 
taken a shot at the police, 
there would have been 
legitimate questions raised about police training 
and police judgment and the unreality of a law 
that led to such an avoidable result.   The 
[accuseds] were travelling together and the 
concerns about officer safety raised by the 
glove-wearing, possibly gun-flourishing Clayton 
gave rise to a sufficient concern about the driver 
to warrant a pat-down search of Farmer for 
officer safety incidental (at that point) to 
Farmer’s continued detention. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and the accused’s 
convictions were restored. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Psychological Detention
“[A] “psychological” detention includes 
three elements:   a police direction or 
demand to an individual; the individual’s 
voluntary compliance with the direction or 
demand, resulting in a deprivation of liberty 
or other serious legal consequences; and the individual’s 
reasonable belief that there is no choice but to comply.” 
Ontario Court of Appeal Justice Laskin, R. v. Grant (2006)
 “If evidence of the crime 
emerges in the course of a valid 
pat-down search incidental to the 
detention for the purpose of 
police safety, the evidence will 
be admissible.”
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Criminal Code Crime Rates 
for Census Metropolitan Areas 
(CMA) 2006 - Top 15
CMA Crime Rate
Regina SK 12,415
Saskatoon SK 12,209
Abbotsford BC 11,224
Winnipeg MB 11,085
Vancouver BC 10,609
Edmonton AB 10,079
Victoria BC 10,066
Thunder Bay ON 9,031
Halifax NS 8,715
London ON 8,137
Saint John NB 7,885
Montreal QC 6,912
St John’s NF 6,773
Windsor ON 6,754
Kingston ON 6,737
Provincial & Territorial Crime Rates 
per 100,000 population.
2006 CANADIAN CRIME STATISTICS
Statistics Canada recently released its report 
entitled “Crime Statistics in Canada, 2006”. 
Highlights include:
• National crime rate dropped by 3%.
• National homicide rate dropped by 10%.
• B.C.’s homicide rate rose by 6%.
• Youth crime rate increased by 3%. Youth homicide rate rose by 
17%. It is now at its highest level since data was first collected in 
1961.
• Total drug offences increased by 2%. Marihuana offences 
dropped by 4%, but cocaine offences rose by 13% and other drug 
offences, which include crystal meth and heroin, rose by 8%.
• B.C. had the highest provincial drug offence rate at 617 per 
100,000. This was more than twice the next highest rate 
(Saskatchewan at 275) and almost five times Newfoundland’s and  
P.E.I.’s rate (127 and 128 respectively).
• Impaired operation rate (including over 80mg% and refusal) 
dropped by 6% nationwide. All provinces saw a decrease in 
impaired operation rates except P.E.I., which remained unchanged, 
and Newfoundland, which increased by 17%. Saskatchewan had 
the highest provincial impaired rate at 474 per 100,000, more 
than three times Ontario’s rate.
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The theme for this year is:
The Future of Police Leadership 
One World, One Voice, One Purpose. 
The subtitle of the conference ‘One World’ recognizes the globalization 
of law enforcement and crime, ‘One Voice’ recognizes the 
convergence of communications and technology, And ‘One Purpose’, 
to break down some of the institutional barriers and recognize law 
enforcement’s primary goal of crime reduction and prevention.
April 14-16, 2008
The British Columbia Association of Chiefs of Police, the Ministry of Public Safety 
and Solicitor General, and the Justice Institute of British Columbia, Police Academy 
are hosting the Police Leadership 2008 Conference in Vancouver, British Columbia, 
location of the 2010 Winter Olympics. This is Canada’s largest police leadership 
conference. The conference is held every two years and attracts international, 
national and regional speakers and delegates.
